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I N'l'RGDUCT I ON 
The purpose of thl' thesis .Hl be to determine the exact nature of the 
firm'SD M'. or firm't'l IIntis _feb Is necess.ry fot the specl.l virtue of 
fortitude In the philosophy of St. 1'ttonIas. St. Thomas speaks of this quaIl ty 
as • reality necess.ry for fortitude, yet noNher. does he say explicitly what 
it J s. It wO 1 be the purpose of thl s thes I s, then, by exam. ftl ng what St. 
ThOMS does say about fortitude, and by considering that In the 1fght of his 
psychology of virtue In geMral. to determIne more ae4urately what he thought 
this reality of rtreltl' 'n'!II to be. 1 
This treatment will necess.rlly observe .tt.1 n Haftations. Ff rst, .... 
phul. wiJJ be ,.eced upon the reality .. feb _ke, the act possible rather than 
upon it ..... lIty. Therefore. the treat.-nt will be prl.rily frOlla non-moraJ 
point of view. 
Second. the contl.rat I on wi II be 11 alted to fort i tude .. am acqu.re4 IIOral 
virtue, not as am Infused virtue or as ,. gift.. However, since. there are times 
when ""at It saiel about the supernatural aspects of fortitude sheds light upon 
Its natural phllosophlca' as~ts. such statements fit Into the general purpose 
of the thes I 5 and will be used. 
'St. T .... uses the ta,.. !~ ill 19..... atKI fI [Ii ,& M!'ltll Inter-
chang .. bly. They wllt occur in e text of quotations In t&. tbesTs. There-
fore. no referanees seem nec:es.ary hera. 
J 
2 
Third, the development of tbe thesis will be primarily doctrinal and not 
hlstorl~al. The treatment of fortitude found in the SYIII IblRJosfl!t I'-II, 
wIJ 1 be used as the basts of the exposition. References to other texts will 
be made as occasion demands to clarIfy or expand issues raised. One historical 
aspect, however. stn~e it leads to certaIn perplexIng dlfficult.es of inter-
pretatIon. AlUst be kept In mInd throughout. This Is the fact thet In his 
treatment of fortitude St. Thomas Is workIng within the fremework of the tra-
ditional Aristotelian militarIstic notion of fortitude, while in his own mInd 
he Is thinking In terms of II very different Christian fortitude. It Is the 
difference bet .... the soldier and the saint. While trying to save Aristotle'S 
position, St. Thomas frequently turns It Into his own. The result often leads 
to confusIon for the student. '01' this reason, this hIstorical dIfficulty will 
be deal t wi ttl as It COllIeS up in the deveJopment of the thesis. 
Fourth, ,hhough fortItude is a virtue, ane! all virtues are habits, the 
~Is wU' not be placed upon the aspect of fortitude as" habit unttJ the 
very end. The re.son for this Is that the habit of fortitude is formed throug 
acts. By studying the formation of tbe ~t of fortltu4e first, It will be 
eas •• r to arrive at an understanding of the nature of the ffAISI! ani!Mt -'fd1 
must 90 into the formation of the habft. 
With these 1I1O'tatlonl In IOlnd, it is now poslible to begin a development 
of the thesis. The fl rst chapter wi J1 be en attempt to arrive at a general 
definitIon of fortitude. This will include a thorough discussion of the sub-
jective uperience of the brave IDiIn In an act of fortitude. at will also 
I nel ude objective const. tuents of an act of forti tude. The second chapter wI 11 
deal with the integra) parts of fortitude, those auxiliary virtues or qualitle 
3 
of soul whIch are necessary for the aet of fortitude itself. The third and 
fourth ebapters will bring a genera' diseusslon of the psychology of human acts 
to bear upon the speclfle situation of fortitude In an attempt to Isolate the 
specifie nature of that flrm'll' tDil!! which makes fortitude what It Is. 
CHAPTER t 
To begin with a general di$~ussion of th. topi~. then, it seems proper to 
dis~uss the notion of fortitude as a virtue. In various places St. Thomn 
gives slightly dIfferent definitions of virtue. but a good functional definItion 
whtch will obviate the necessity of a lengthy and unne¢essary tuepJanatlon might 
be this: "Ad virtutem humanam pertinet ut faciat hominem et opus elus secundum 
ratfonem esse.'.2 
Row, there are several ways In \f4fdch a person might be !!£yn4um ralionem. 
First. if his inte1Ject i. US~Mm r'5i.91lf&. he has the Intellectual virtues. 
Second, if his human acts. those acts pe.rfol"lMld knowingly and freely, are a-
f;Uncjum rlSi9!l!11 he hal moral vi rtue. 
There are sever.l ways, In turn, by \!!Ihleh a person's human acts mIght be in 
accord with reason (Mfymbe rfltio!!fi!l. First, he must know fAlhat is good for 
him to do tn each particular instance. Thi$ pertains to the virtue of prudence 
Second. once a person knows what is good for him to do in anv particular in-
stance, this good must be acc:epted and freely choaen by the will. This per-
tains to the virtue of Justice. the virtue by whIch "rectitude rationis in rebus 
2 1-1", II-II. J23. I ~. 
"rbe fact that pruden~e bridges 
~irtues wll' not be dealt with here. l!!:!1., 23. 1. 4 sol. 2 ad 3. 
the gap betwen the intellectual and moral 
See!.!., 1-11,57.5 c; and also In III 
5 
humanh instltyitur.,,4 
However, In human activity the situation Is never sImply a matter of the 
will's acceptance of the dfctates of rIght reason. Granted that the w"', 
through the genera. vi rtue of Jystice. is to be ordered to choose the good pro-
posed by reason, there are stili impediments whtch tend to hinder this choice 
of the good. Thus there arIses the need for other vIrtues by which a person 
might be t n ac.cord wi th reason. As a result of these protective vi rtues. the 
Impediments to the dIolce of the rattonal good are removed: Utotluntur impedi-
menta hu'us rectitudlnh in rebus humanls ponendae.,,5 
In general, these ',..IIRents are of two kinds. 'Irst, the proper exer-
che of the wfJ 1 can be '..-ded by an attraction nab allquo detec;tabtl 1.116 
That .is. something ple8s'n$ to the senses often tends to pull the will away from 
dofng that which rIght reason dIctates'? The vI rtYe whIch combats this Impedl ... 
ment Is the vIrtue of teallperance. The second .,..d"_nt repels the will "ab 
eo quod est secundum ratlonem propter aJlquod dlfficJle quod inCUllbi toll8 That 
fs, the wIll Is Impeded from fo'l~ng rIght reason because of some dlfftculty 
which stancls In the way of following the ratlona' good. The virtue which over-
COMS this ' .... Sment 's fortitude: HAd hoc Impedimentum tollendum requl rl tur 
wit) 
4Justlce here, 1.1., 11 ... 11. f23, 
be explained more fully tater. 
Sjl_I., 11-", J23. J c. 
6JJt1i. 
I c, is taken In a very wide sense. This 
71xactly how the sense appetites can fnflyenee the will will be dIscussed 
later. 
8 1.1., II-II. 123. 1 c. 
6 
fortltudo mentIs, qua scilicet hu.usmodi dlfficultatlbu$ reslstat ... 9 
The situation ef fortitude, then. explained in ultra-sin.,Hfled ferm, Is 
th is: Reason propose, a good to be sought. The wll J, on the suppes I tI on that 
it is rl·ghtly ordered, .,uld ordinarily choose to sG$k this good. However, it 
is a good difficult to attain, $0 difficult that the very aspect of the dIffI-
culty tends te impede the wil"s choice to attain it. It Is here that fortltuo 
steps In t<' meet the difficulty, thus leaving the wn I free te seek the good!O 
and it t s preel set y here that the need and p J ace Gf f,f *:'ft' wen' mae appears. 
This general structure cf fortitude. as already stated. has been ultr .. 
5'.' fifed. It ls now necessary to exalne Its various aspects IDOre in cletaU. 
First, the notlon.of difficulty should come under closer scrutIny. What 
is hlplOttant heta Is that the subject, the brave un, fftUat perceive the dlffi. 
cult object prec'se'y as difficult. Thus, ... n mIght, from the exterilOr, seem 
tc be brave in .. tlng obJect've «Ufflcultles, .reas In "tuaU ty he may not 
be acting bravely at all. He My. for ....... be totally or partially ignor-
ant of the danger's gravity. He may MYe undergone this difftculty so many 
times bef.r. that It no longer ...... dl tftcult tlO him. He may have g,e.at con-
fidence In .. certain skill .... feb tend. to lessen the difficulty •• he exper'ence 
It." lut tlte truly brave .. n, In the act IOf bravery. pereelves the difficulty 
precls.ly as difficult. 
How theA. the perception of difficulty works. deflnhe .ffect on the human 
9.!.kLi. 
10'or this reason fortitude Is Hid to be conservative (SQnHrx,tiva) of 
the: good of reason. See 1.1.. 11.11, 123. 12 c. 
It 1.1 •• 11-.,. 123, 1 ad 2, covers .11 the cases mentioned. 
7 
.,.r.on. It arou ... in blm certain feetlngs, called by St. ThomI$ pesslons. It 
is these pas.ions tidc:h ....... '.t.ly h.fluence the will away frora the rational 
~; and, therefore, It Is they whidt must be control Jed by trOl';. el •. 
It is. In fact. die .. passIons which actually become the subjects of the virtue 
~f forti t .... In the sense that mIn'sratlonal JM*I8rt .. st so gove.m them tlMat 
they truly partIcipate In reaon Itself. J2 It Is 0' the utmost l,.ortance, 
then, to discuss tke paslons Involved In an act .f fortitude. 
Pr'marlly, tM peru,tlon of cUffJcuH:y .rouses the p.slon of fear: uo.uoct 
~t_ aU"uis retr .... tur ab aUquo dlffle'H. ,ertlnet ad ratlonem tlmorls. qui 
• .-tat reoea ........ a _10 dlfficultatell babent. • •• it Ideo fortltudo 
prlnclp.I'ter est cJrca tlmores dlff'cillu. rerun, quIe retrahar. poesunt 
voluntatem a sequela ,.atIOftIs.ttl] Thlt is. the pereeptlon of cUfftewl ty cauteS 
fe.r to rise In the beart of....... this 'ea, tends to Influence Ute wI tJ away 
from following the dlctat.s of reatOn. Therefore, It is the Job of the flr.ltal 
lanl_ of forUtucie to control or overCOllle this '.1'.14 
t~.l.' 1-'1, 56. , • 4 c. 
I) ~.. tl), J c. 
14ActWlnYl it i. fortitude's Job to preserve tbe .. n bet\1lleeA too much 
and too tittle feat': "0a1l1s aut_ vit'tus a»ralfs ponh orXlum rationis In 
mater •• elrea quaaa est. Uncle .. fortltu4i.,. partlat tillOr IIOder&tus secunclum 
rationem: ut sci' feet homo timNt quodoportett- et qu~ .. ;.:..'!"tet~ et simi} iter 
Ide all is. .ie .ut_ ""s ratlonls cor,.,. potes" slcut per acess.., Ita et 
per de'.ctta. tJnde slcut tlmJdltas opponltur fortitudlnl per exceS.SI.I1l timor's, 
Inqu.tntuna sci t feet hoar,) ti.t quoct non aport.t, yel secundum quod non oportet; 
Ita etiara i~iditas opponitur el per defec.tum timoris. Inq..aantum sclilcet non 
tImet .1 iquis quo4 oportet tl.re."-.w.sl., 126, 2 c. However, or41 ... ,lly the 
probJem is to ove~ an exc:ess of fear, and SO St. Thomas cklals ahoo$t ax-
elusively with thi • ..,eet of fortitude, tbe 4Ontrol of fur. 
8 
",*-ver, fear ,. not the only passion with ""Ieb fortitude bas to deal. 
1000rtet aut_ huiusnGdl cUffici1fum I.ulsum non solum firmlter tolerave 
~I bencIe timor., sed eti_ moderate fl9gredl. qundo scll tc:et oportet aa ex-
terminere ad se<:urltatem in posterum b_bendam. Quod vr.tur pertinere ad 
Irationa& aucI.etae.ut5 Therefore, at tlmBS the difficulty Is such that to over. 
!come It one must not li..,ty conquer his fear. but he must go to the attack in 
preter to extenainete tbe difficulty. rbts, a.ys St .. ThOMs, requires the 
passion of boldness, the .,.s.lon _Ic:h conaists In ulnvedendo hi quod est hondnl 
contrar ...... l6 
Thul, the tw prineipal passions Involved ilt fortitude are fear and bold-
ness. These are the passions tAl. ch .. at be brought under the control of reason 
and partlc'pate In reason If the win Is to be f .... to c:hooM and follow the 
rational good • .l7 In the one case fortitude acts on fur to repress It; in 
the other fort.tude eets on boldness to engender It. J8 
But to un4erstand better the role of few and boldness In the act of fort'-
tude, end thereby to understand better tlleect of fortitude itself •• brief 
151.1 .• It-H. 123. , c. 
J6JJU..t!., 127. J ad 2. 
17Tner• are .'so other p.sslons -mldl baYe difficulty .s an object. St. 
Tbomas's reaaons for reJeGtJng these pas.'ORS In favor of fear and boldness as 
the principal IrasclbJe palsion. will not be •• h with here since ttte present 
Object .S .,el, to u"r.tand St. Thomas •• own vIew of the cty.,..cs of an act 
of fort I tude. 
ISAg •• n• a$ with fear, it Is fortlt .. •• job to pre.erve the mean between 
too much and tOO lIule boldness. However. In the face of real danger it Is 
,eidola dl fflcu' t to repr ••• an exce •• of boldness. Therefore. u ••• fortitudo 
pi us uti tur audcta quaD eam reprl_t."--§..l •• II-II. 161. , ad 3. 
9 
~Janatlon of the dynamics of these eM) passions Is necessary. Their action 
nIght be expl.,ned in the following way: First. each Is a reaction to an object 
)ercelvecl as an evil <ma'!!!!) for the one perc:elvlng. This evil Is apprehended 
~s stIli in the future and •• possIble of being avoided or overcome. Thus far 
~he objects causing fear ami bo'dness ere the Nllel a threat to the IndivIdual, 
n the futur., not unavoidable. 
Tbey differ, hoNeysr, In thIs, thet fear arises at the perception of this 
~vn, threatenIng object In the future uncIer the aspect 0' fts i~ndlng danger 
o the 1 ndfvlclual. while bolclftess arises at the perception of the same object 
fmder tt-~ ~c.t of its avoldablaness or of Its being able to be overcome. 
rhu., fear shrinks from 'w' UIIl futurum prap'nquurIl cui resist I de faei 11 non 
POt.st ... I, On the other banel. boldness attacks tlt.rrlbi lIa sub spa alleu'us 
J>onI.u20 Nevertheless. despite these opposite tendencies, both ere responding 
o the ... object. 
In fact. the twO seem to be at oppo$Ite ends of a continuum. In GO far as 
",he Indlvf.su.l perceIves thIs difficult. future evil .. less and Jess possible 
~f beIng avo ... , he fMrs It to .• greeter and greater degree. If the point 
_ .. where he perceives it •• Impossible O'f being avoided, then his fear turns 
~o ..... ss; 'or the evil .. as he .,..rehends It, ••• 1 ready upon bll." 21 
I\.r., '-H. '+.3, l c. St. Thomes further exp.alns the object of reer as 
a dlffl*,Tty .. feb uexc:edft potestatem timentts, ut seil teet e. reslstl non 
possit.H-.1.2Lt .. , '+1, .. c. This object is" Ifmalum 1 .. lnene quod non de feciJ. 
repel I i poteat .u_.L\Lt •• 42, 5 c. 
20 1.1., II-tl. 144, 3 e. Also 1.1 •• I-II. 45. I c .. 
211.1 .. I-I., 42, 2 c & 3 ad 2. 
10 
On the other hud, If the Individual perceives this saM difficult future evil 
as more .. more po.slble of belnt overcome, the thr.t ......... , and his 
boldness trows , .... , ..... , .... t.... The rea ... for thl. '1 that the possibili-
ty of IUeottSS ....... rs hope. and hope en ......... boldnes.: "Provocatur s .... 
cauHIIS audacl_, per ....... fachtnt nos _stl .. ,.. quod pos •• It"e .ft 84.,flel 
vlctorl_ ... 12 
Nope works I. thl. way: I f one _ ..... the ... difficult, tn,..t •• lnl 
object In the futu,.. It 'S obvious that dds _j_t can .JIO be ."rehended 
sl_Itaaeously, but"'" another .s ..... , as • vooct. That Is. as In the caN 
of fortitude. this dlff •• " obJMt Is ..... to a 'urther good, and as such 't 
.. tural1y ,.,tlel,.,.s to a cIe, .... In the ~s of the end tewe'" which It 
serve .... raeant. U_, .. , When the 4I1ft .... h object ..... rs •• one which 
ca. reaUy ... ewe ...... the obJ"t Itself,atees Oft • certain .spect of fIOOdness. 
VI'" I.althat of , .... tw ways, the NIR8 obj .. t beconaes not • possible, 
~lfflcultf evil _ject In the future. but • pos.lbl., tUffieult, good object In 
the futu..... 1ft other ..... tbe .... -J-t .... at tM .... tl_. thouth under 
~Ifferent .. ,acts • .".., as bot" .. evil .... ..... It's this 41fffcuh 
~J-t 'ft the tvtu .......... , the .spact of Its .... 's which ceu ... hope: HS,.. 
•• t _tus .".tftlvee vlrtutls cons,.. __ ............ 10II8II boaf 'ut",' ....... 
22 
,bI4 •• 4S, J c. 
11 
posslbllls adIP.scl. ,.23 
Now, as the apprehension of thl. object under the aspect of Its goodness 
Increa.es, hope Increases. And as hope Inc ........ fear correspondingly .... 
creasea.
24 LikewIse, as hope Increases bo ..... increa.es: HEx hoc enlm quod 
allquls sperat super.re terrlbl.a 1_lnens, ex hoe auclac:ter Insequltur ips\ID. "25 
The conve, .. Is also true. As fear Inc ........ hope decreases. untIl fear turns 
Into sadness and hope vanishes completely. 
Everything depeacts, then, on the _pect t.mder whIch this ell ffl cu It object 
In the future Is .",.hended. If 100'" upen.s an evil, It cause. fea,. If 
looked upon a. a good. it en ....... hope, which in turn engenders boldnes •• 
231.1_, '-II, Ato, 2 e. It would be well to _tion at this point that the 
llIOYell8ftt of the .... tltlve potMCY .po'" .f he,. .... not be r •• ttlcted to the 
sans. appetite. alone.. Thl. applle. not oaly to hope but to all the .".tlte •• 
St. T ..... _Ices thIs ." .. el .. ,: 'tSuM , ..... tJtu .uperlorl allquae opera-
tlones COAI"alle. passlonlbus Infe,lo,ls .".tltus."-""!!.V.r., 26, 9 act 5. 8y 
higher .... 'It. St. ThcRaI .... ns the will. CI. II. ~,"I. 1 Cj 1.1., '-'. 
82, 5 c. Thl. point Is stressed by Noble, " •• liutbfen .e persuade, que dans 
son 10lIl tralt'.s ,. •• IOM (.-... ct. uu -XLVIII) $. Thoma. ne d8erlt.,.s 
... ,..slons unl .... nt .... Ibl •••• ,. tout a •• MOUvemtmt. affectlf. de Ilime. 
CeJ.tan ae cUt t," nett_t flau son .... t.'re. 'I. XLVIII, a,t. At: Unfver .. 
s.Uter passlones tr.MUIe sunt, t_ pro pas.fORIIN. quaa pro actl~u, vohmtatll 
sl ... fbus pal.lonllNs."-H.D. Nobl., O.P., ttC_, I. ,..slon .,.jol. ,. 
VOlont8,U Dlvus Thelia, (Placeua), .. I (January 1926), 643 not. 14. While In 
treat'ng the virtue 0 fortitude St. T .... Is .peaklng primarily of .... appe-
tlt.s, It shou)4 be bora In .11td that thIs does not exclude a corresponcUng act 
of the "I" followln, la.elleetual a ......... _. Thl. "II I become cl ..... r as 
the thes Is pro.,... .... 
24 . 1.!., '-II, 42, 5 ad 1. 
2S. bld., 45. 2 c. This can also be .tateel In another way: l'(luaecumque 
nata sunt c:eusare .,... vel eKel"re tl_rem. StM' causae .ucteclae.1I Ulld. f 
45. 3 c. Cf. also 1.!-, II-II. 125. 2 ad 3. 
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To stl1n8ri&e, now. the sItuation of fortItude as thus far ."rlbe4, sup-
pose that a man Is faced with a difficulty which stand, In the way of a pel 
proposed by reaton. This diffIculty looms as a threat to his 0'tIIJl personal 
welfare. If he ."rehends It more as a difficulty from which It fs not Hl«lly 
he can escape, .. whlcb It Is not l.kely he C8Il overCOtAe, then fee, ,layS the 
.tomin .. t role, thou", __ hope ,..Ins because he stili at 'east .... 1I_s the 
potslblllty of escape or victory. On the other haRd. If he a.,prehencls this 
difficulty rather In the Ught of the possibility of overcoming It. or 1ft the 
If.,t of the goo4 which .. tlng It will hel, him attain. then hope .,rt. into 
his heart. and as a .... uh of hope bold_. also, a spontaneous. s,I,lted 
movement to ove ..... this diffIculty. Vet, .... fu,. too, remal .. , s,_ 
there Is stilI the possibility that the .. Iff.culty _y not be overcome. 
The above. thea, coastltute. the ,Icture .f the Internal _perlence on the 
level of the ,.,sIOfts IN"'" to the actual eet of fortltucle. The 'Ictu .... how-
ever, Is adMittedly a ..,.,al one, and wIll have to be.,.,.." ........ t. Be-
fore 'roceecIl .... alons this' I •• however, It Is 'frst necessary to de"ne more 
clearly the exact COft~tof thitt act wh'ch fs most ,,,"lfScal'y on. of fonl-
tucle. 
This can be do. by concentrating once .,. on the aspect of difficulty 
which II basIc to the N' of fortitude, thet Is. Oft the peculiar type of dlffl" 
culty the act of fort' •• Is __ t to _t. 'or the fact Is ,hat the p,.ctl~ 
of all vl,tue Involves .... dIfficulty. aNI hi this sense fortitude Is ..... irecl 
and Is u .... an .U vi nUll. "Cul Ifbet enlm vlrtuti IIIOr.lI, eK hoc quod est 
~Itua, COAYenlt qua .... flnalt.s, ut a c:orat,.,to non moveatur: quod enctum 
•• t ad fortitud'MIA ,.rtl .. ,.. ... 16 
HOwe." It Is obvIously also true that as the diffIculty ,FOWl the fo,tl-
tude required ... t .,. If'Mte,. It foU ... then, that the ultimate, the .,.-
jelfle, .act of fortltUllht as such will be that 'ft which the 41fflculty Is grat.st 
It Is this ,,..lfle Ht I. which .. are IAt.., ... ted he .... the act In Which fea, 
gr<MS lIOIt terrIble end fA which "hi .. , Is ,he IDOIt 41fflcult to mutter. To 
~t such. satuatlon ~J,..s the "ltl __ 1ft flmIS!! e'''. 1ft ...... '.1 
way St. ThoMs ltat .. that thl. ultl_t8 act _I.ts "In l"stl"'l, at ,..-
pellendls his IA .ft. .. _Ime 411 fficUe .. t fI ... ltat_ habere, sell icet fn 
allqulbus ,.,Icu) Is .,.lvlbus.,.17 
Now theA, the,.. Is no doubt In the mInd of St. ThoRtas .s to .actly what 
the •• f. grave .... ,. ..... T ....... Is. 1ft faot, only one whIch stands out 
above .1 J others.. Thil Is the dange, of deetb.d The clanger of death strlka 
the ..... t •• t. most unavol"""e, most I,reduclble fear Into the heart of .... 
The reaSOA I. , • ..,1. eneugh: 'fOIanis tl., ex ..,re .... c.''''r.,,19 A IIIn 
.,..,. to 10M Oftly that WhIch he· first loves.. ''EM hoc ent. quod aUqul. ema, 
26 1.1., I-II, 61, 4 e. See 81so I! ~'fSYS •• 1~ 12 ad13. 
17!_I ........ 11),2. e. 
28 . I.! .• II -tl. 1131 It c. St. TI'lonM i_i,ts Oft this fact In various: pa ....... S.!., I-II, .', "c.; 11-", II" It Cj 124, 3 C" ,. OJ De VI,tut., 
I. 12 ad 237 . -
2.9 S.T., "-II, JUt 1+ ad 2. Love, ia fac:.t Is the basic AU" of elf the 
passloni:- I.!., '·11, 41, 2 ad I. 
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allquld bonunt •• equltur quod prlvatlVUDI tal is bonl sit el malUrA •• t per cona.-
quens quod tl ... t Ips_ taaquam mah ..... 'O Now. no men love. anything with as 
natura' aAd IndestructIble It love a. that with whIch he loves his own llfe. 31 
To lose his IIf. means to 100e his very self eM ell he hes In the world. St. 
Thomas .\81 up thl. position very neatly ..... CCIIIIentlng on Aristotle: 
AUqul. dlcltur •• ..,lIclter fortis ex eo quod e.t Intrepldus circe 
.. cauae .unt I118Xt_ '.,ribl"a. Virtu. _11Il det.rmlnatur HCU ..... 
ultl .... In potentl •• lit dlcltur In prillO .. ~; Ideo oport., quod 
"l1,t .... fo,tltud .. ". sit circe .. q .... $VAt aiiiliiiii tarrlbi Ila. Ita 
quod nullu. _gls sust ..... t perlcul. q.-a fortis. Int.r OI8ftla auum 
llMi_ t.rr ....... t lIOn. It hula ratio Nt, quia mort e.t ta,-
.hws totlus 'r ..... '. vlt_. at ..... hll post IIOrt_ vldetur es .. 
hu t usmad I boAum aut _IY11. d. hIs .... pert I IIMt act 'r .... nt_ v I tall, 
q ..... nobis '.f ....... , .rt_. Ea enl. 4UM pertinent ad statum 8ft1-
_rum POlt IIOrt_ ... lUAt vlslbilia "'s. Vahl ..... t .. te,rlblt. 
est Id per quoct hOIIO ,.rdlt c:xanla &aoM. ~vfdetur quod fortlt .... 
,roprl. lit cl rca tl.,. periculo". IIOrUs. 
Whll. fn the ... ,.. ... ,. St. ThGIau I. "hte4ly coaaentlq on 
30 1.1., 1-", 43, I c. 
310 .. mltht uk. thaft, how it would ever .. posslbl. for anyone to CORalt 
sulc... One .Ight also cont .... that ,..,. 40 love other real hIes, repu-
tatIon for .... , •• 110,. tbaA IIf. It .. lf. Aft ."quat. __ r to the .. obJec-
tions tIOUld Involve a I .... ty dlscussloa whIch would not be partlc.ularly rel.-
VaAt to the purpose of tM theal.. 8y _y .f antWr her. it can si.,ly be 
ltated that, while St. TheM. admits that SUbjectively a person might love 
somethlRl else RIOr. t ..... "fe, as In lulclde, yet <*jectlvely thfs Is '''POsII-
b)e, the reason Nt", that these other loves Iheu1c1 be controlled by other 
vlrt...... 'or ""' •• If • ,.rson c:oeah. sulci. Mea ..... he loves his repu-
tatIon too IlUch, he has ... so becau .. he lacks the hulaUlty which MOUld 
no .... ly control this 10\18 of reputation. Jut lItO other vi rtue can COBtrol the 
love of Ii f.. This Is t,rectuclbJ.. Further, St. ThCllnal ts speakl", her. 
prl.rUyof love .s felt ... the .e" .. '.vel, .... 8ft this level It Is (Ufllcult 
to se. what coul" be loved_re thaft I'fe Itself. St. Thalas hal In ral .. fear 
In the ......... tlt. whfch has as hs object the physIcal evil of death. Cf. 
S.T., II-II. 113, 4 ad a, 125,2 c. 
-- 32 In III IShIi •• leet., 14, n. 536. 
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Aristotle, who cUd not share the Christian f.eth ht life .fter death, neverthe-
less. frora the woretlng of his CQaIIeAt.ry It Is ,taln that he .g ..... with 
Aristotle that death Is the most terrIble of physical evils. White. man .. y 
have faith and hope In II,. .fte .. death. It Is __ the less true that the end 
of 11 f. on earth Is, psychologically .t least. the end of everythlnl. What 
lies beyond Is ftOt clear; and, even I f It .re, to tet to the beyond Involves al'l 
end of life •• It Is knaIM In thls .orld. While It _y be anet shoul4 be true 
thet in a higher .. se there Is no fea .. of "th for the. Nn who has faith In 
God. stili, on the , .... of tense a".t'" thl. fM, cannot be avo'''. And It 
Is on thl. 'evel thet the eet of fortlt" " ... ,Ily works. It fights the 'ee, 
of a corporal. physlceJ .wI': "Fortlt. onll_Wr eel mala corporalla ... 33 Ant 
no physical .vll can De ..... t.r than bodily 4eath.. ',..1_ aut_ terrlbU. 
int.r ORtnla corpora" ... t. Nt IIOra, ... tollh _Ia co rpe ra If a bona.""" 
Thus, even a .,tyr. who has all the coaflcleMe III the world that he wil J enjoy 
eternel I.f., I. literally scared atlff of 4eath .t ... f. 35 
Once ctMth has beeR .. t""shed .s the ,reate.t 4. ff'culty the brave .. n 
must Met, St. ThGllaa 101M on to ctetenat .. which type of clanger of death offer. 
the ,reat •• t ,roundt for for'ltucle. foB ..... the lead of Ariltotl., he co,,-
331_1_, II-II. 113. ,I ad 2. 
~ 5.T •• '1-11. 113, 4 c. 
35. b1ct •• 8 c. This ........ ttow.ver, .,_ •• " ..... exce,tlon to this rule 
which SGII8tl .. COIUU about by specla' grace. 
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eludes that to face the ...... r of death In war would be the ultimate 'n forti ... 
tude. '''ortltudo ,roprl. est cl rca perieula mortis quae est In bello.n36 
Thll, heMever, .... to be a cas. where St .. ThoDu Is trylnt to save the Arlst.-
tellan notion of a .1 I ltarlstlc fortItude Where heroism 1ft war II the uhimate.) r 
Actually, workl", within this framework. he twll .. the t1I8M1nt to fit his om 
purposes. He'" this tty _pendlag the notl_ of war to Include undergoing 
the .... r of death, 8 .. t"ful OM, for a...... What he .rtahdy has In 
mind .re the variOUS types of Chr'stl_ -ny..... Thul, he dl.tJ"lui,het be-
tweea I 'bel hili ..,..r.le," '-leb per'.'", to Midi .... fllhtlnl en the Mttle line, 
and .... h. ,.r.lcul .... , .. 38 Which penal. to ... _.vldual """'r."", eta .... r of 
"th I" a ver'ety of wys. 
'ft concduslOll. t .... It.s certahdy St. ThaIes IS mind that to uataer90 the 
.... ' of "th .. the ... ltlll8'. In forth., though ROt necessarily a 101dler' 
dee.h In .r. 
I t has .... howa tNlt the Ht of foR·,.,* has to do both wi th ...,,.... I n, 
36 IIIld., S c. 
37Arf 'totla ._ br_.,., In.r tbe , .... t_t .because 1ft war a fR8ft f ... 
H ...... "ou1 .... , .. at optl •• H--!!! HI ~., IMt. 14. The "'ger, are 
!!p •• beceuM ....... el .. Is deft .. , ofCliiih • , .... t. They are apSil!! be .. 
cause u .... ,.,.. for the hl .... t end, the GOIIIDOft good. Obylou.ly, St. ThGmas 
could not fully ...... tlflth either of theM ....... Meause his notIon of 
Christi .... rty .... 'ft.ro4uces .., anct more ImpOrtant factor •• 
381 .. 1_. "-II, 12S, S c. CaJetan. -.tlne Oft thIs passege, .,lalft5 St. TheMs's pos'tlon as a departure from the ArIstotelian .l1lta,Isll.: ... of 
fortitude. S.. TtKaas'" "1o CaJetaftUS, 'wtary OR fur. Tl1eolo,'., con-
t.lned 'ft !l!ra OM" 1. Thorlae. Leonine tid. a_, 8Ii), ,IS. 
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fear and engender'", bol",s. It has also beu shown that the sltue,l_ In 
~'ch fear Is ,..". .. sed Of' bot_ss ............ to constitute •• eet of fortI-
tude In the ultf_ta ...... IIWSt be the situation in which the dIfficulty which 
c:onstltu,e. the object of both fur and &toldness is the cUffleulty of uadergoh'9 
the eta., of death. It Is now nec:eSNry to sbctof more ,reclsely hew fear .ft4t 
bo' .... operate It, .. tl"l the danger of _th. 
O. the Nsls of the separate fURetlOftS of fear .. boldness In f&ell'll 
cUfficultJe., It. ThcaaS divlcles fortitude tnto tw ..,.rate acts. 0., that 
of attack, cIea., with the ,. •• on of bold.... The other, that of enduruce, 
.... ,. wIth the pa •• 'on .f .,..,.39 It will ..... necessary to __ I .... the 
structure of theM two actt. 
The first Is the act of attack. It. Themal conceives its at,..,t",. in 
t.1Is wey: A person perceives a cUfflculty, • threet to his own life. Which 
stands In the _y of the tpod .... he...at. Thle"" Is not ..... I.t.ly 
upon him but further in the future.40 Likewise. thou,,, • real danger, it a,-
pearl thlt he can owroorae It. thet I tit ..... r then he. 41 A. a ....... 1 t t hope 
rl ses that he wIll t,l", over the cia.,. Th ls leads to a sp 1 , I ted mQ\feMnt 
of bol",. whIch ....... hi. to out to the attack .... coafroat tho •• r. 
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He may even IWIIIIOft the pes,lon of an,. .. to his aid If the dante .. is such that it 
rouses anger in him. If Ad I r. pertS.t I .. U I,.. In rem contrlstant_. et Sic 
di .. Kt. cooperatur fo .. tltudhtl In a9Iredlendo. u42 
The picture here Is one of a spirited, hopeful, confident. al_st trlumpha .. 
decision to _t a threat to one's IIf •• a threat w.h:.h Itlll II., .a the future 
fa threat _Ich. though real. a"..rs 8S definitely able to be overcame. 
Note that the picture of the act of'attack painted here.,.. well beyond 
what •• Indluted ....... r when It ... .,181ned tNit the brave man must 
5OII8tl_s .... bolclne.s to attHk a dlfflculty 1ft order to ,reserve the good of 
reason.
43 Here the .ituatlon or the c're.-taftCeS In whIch this ag,ression 
takes ,lace .s limited to a very definIte area. _Iy, the situation in which 
the attacker matcM the _Isfon to attack .. ."fflculty which ., not yet actually 
upon him, and which .... definitely feels superIor to.44 
The picture of tbe act of .... u .. ance. haliever. Is quite dlffer.t. In .n-
41 Ib14., 10 .. 3. 
43 lJW!.. 3 c. See .... 8. 
440. mltht uk why the tcope of .. act of attack should be so limited. 
Is It not possible. for ...,'e, that at U ... the IOOCI of rea ... might .... nd 
that. person .ttack a .ttoft .. r foe? Th ••• '.'.'y ..... ns in real lif •• 
Likewise. shout .. the at of attack be IImfted to • "'sIOft to fltht a future 
diffIculty? 'I the,.. .... ti_ 1ft the actval a.tack wheft the difficulty 'S 
I...., •• ' •• y ,...HAt? A .. 'uUon to ,hiS ,,..,_ 's not .. 1Iee1 fo, here, since 
the malA _JMt II to ...... t .. St. Thoraas's ... thoutht. ttawever, one posli" 
ble Int."re,.,loa of .t_ ThoMal·. lit ...... Igbt .. 'his: When the dante' ."..rl 
stronte' ......... It I. no lonte' •• the fu,ure but 1 .... U.t.ly present, then 
the act of attack tur. Iftto aft act of .. v, .... even though phYllcaHy 
speakf", It conti.,.. to be an act of attack. Thus. a IOldl.r actually at-
tackin, a foe ..... reall .. to be stronger wouhl really be psychologically 
endvrlnt and not attacklAg. 
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durance the th .... t to one'l life is much greater. It appears as the .tronger, 
the overpawerlng th .... t.1tS The danger I ...... Iat.ly ,re •• nt,46 $0 I ....... t •• 
In fact, that It I futurity turns into actual physical sufferln •• %7 As this 
happens the hope of dellverence v.nlshes and fear turns Into ,....... The .ot 
of endurance IHac:omes the actual endurance of pain, and that over .. perIod of 
time. 48 
In thla act there .. be no help from the PI •• lons, no sense of hope or Joy 
no s,I,'ted .... hu.l_ for victory, because the patn of .... blotl aU these 
out.49 There Is only the finn ,at'OMI .t ..... MtIOA to .bl. by .. '1 declsio 
to hold on, to enclure for the sake of .... hI .... ' toocI proposed by .... 1Oft. In 
this senl8, "huncectUID lola ,atl. per .. '.It ... 50 
Note that this ,'etuN of the act of .... unmce also goes _II beyond what 
45 1.1., II-I., 12,. 6 ad •• 
46,hhl. 
47.bI4., 19 III ItblS-, leet. 18. n. S84, and 1.1 •• II-II, 123. 8 c. 
48 1 .. 1., .. -.. , 113. 6 ad 1.. 
49s .. 1.1., II-II. 123, 8 on thl. polltt. St. Thonlal .r .... that In the 
act of endu,ance a person .uffs,. trlsU»: frca the a"rehenSlon of the Im-~lat. denger to bls life. . He al.o IU,.. JI!!2!: !!'!Ius from the actual ,hysl 
leal ... In beln. uncter.... At ,he ... ,1_ hi_Joys a .'!SI!tlo which 
II ... proprl. ~ultur oper. vlrtut ..... *' Tbia •• " .. tlo cancels out the 
trlltlt',., laut the .'0' teaSUI f. tura .,..Is out the ail_tatlo. The net r. 
fluh, thea, of the total experience Is the o¥larwhelm'ng COftlclOt.t$MII of pa'a. 
IA .... ltutll .. corpora", 4010rll ..... eWIft8SC" .' •• '8,10 splrltuaUs ••• qula ~tor c:orporaUs .. t .... UtI lIor •••• t ." ....... slo sensitive -.Is elt helmlnl In 
~.'feato.II-"II', 8 ad J. 
50 1.1-, II-II, '23, 10 ad J. 
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Was Indicated .... II ... when It was .Imply stated thet the b .. ave raan !lUst be able 
to stand firm and control his fear of the dange .. of death. The .. e have been two 
spec I flcally new ehnents Introduced here. The f' .. st Is the notion that the ac 
of endurance 'nvolves not only the passion of f.r, but also that of sadnels; 
and, even beyond thll, It Includes actual physical suffe .. ln,. St. Themes Is 
most expllo.lt on this point: HAd fortem aut. pertinet non soh. Itare cont .. a 
tillON. futurorum ,. .. Ioulonn, sed etl_ in ipsls ,. .. lculls perslste .. e, sleut 
prius dlctUil est. It'deo dicit quod ,raecipue dlcuntu .. fortes ex eo quod bene 
sUltlnent trlsUtls, ..... t ' .... sentlat U:er •• Inentla. puta pereusslones et 
wl .... r.. It lade est quod fortltudo haiaet t,,'stitl_ adjunct_ouSt The seccm 
new .Ieatent Is the notIon of a ItlA,th of t'_ MI", Invo1ved In the endu .. ance. S2 
Therefo .. e, It ...... clear that there .S a itastc and clearly marked dt ff ... 
eno.e bebMen the two acts of the same virtue.. The act of attack Is a spirited 
~vement agaInst a weake .. oppoMnt who 10GII8 as a danger In the future. The ac 
of endurance's. det.,.. ..... resolution .. ,lte the contrary movenaents of the 
paSSions and of actual .... pain to stand fI .... against a st .. onge .. opponent who 
(or which) Is actually' ........ t aod InflIcting ,.In, and that over a pe ... od of 
tiM. 
SIJJ! I tI "hie., leet. 18, n. 584. The ,rob' .. here Is that whereas St. 
Thantas orl,ine y stated that fo .. tltude has to do with fear. he now b .. lngs 
sadness. ,rlatltla, IJtto the ,'cture, Sadness Is ...... ctlon of the sense appe-
tite to a ;hysical evil which Is Ill1necnat.'y present.--S.T., '-11.42,3 ad 2. 
Further. the passion of sactnus should properly be governed by the vl .. tue of 
pat i enc:e. Th I s ,rob t em ",HI be taken up I n the next chapter. 
S2!_!., 11_1', 123. 6 ad 1. Allin, a ,roblem arises, for the vi .. tue of 
perseve .. ance should properly govern endu ... ace which tasts over a pe .. loci of time. 
ThIs problem will also be taken up In the AMt chapter. 
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These differences are most striking. It seems difficult, in fact. to 
class the act of attack with that of endurance as an act requiring the ultfmate 
in fieslt!! anl!!!e. And, in fet. In the mind of St. Thomas the two do not 
rate equal Importance. He melntalns that the act of endurance is the principal 
act of fortitude: "Principallor actus fortitudlnis est sust.nere, Id est 
hmobiliter sistere In pericutis, quam 89gredi.uS' No further proof of this 
fact seems necessary. The ci rcumstances th .. el ves of the two acts tell the 
story. Clearly, the fltll s. eolM! necessary for fortitude need not be .s 
great In the act of attaGk as In that of endurance. Basically, the difference 
seems to be this: ItAudaei. autem eonsurgft ex hoe quod al iqufs aestfmat eum 
quem invadlt, suam non excedere potestatem. • •• DlfficlJfus autem est stare 
contra fortIor., quam insurgere in aequalem vel mlnorem. lI54 
Therefore, the discussion will henceforth center mre on the act of endu ... 
anee as the ultimate in f'rmlt. anl_. though not to the exclusion of the act 
of attack, which also ...,loys the same flemh'l aD'. though to a lesser degree 
To understand further the sItuation tn whIch the acts of fortftude take 
place, It will now be necessary to go on to discuss the integral parts of forti-
tude. those other vi ftueS l!IIhlcb St. Thorae. conceIves as necessary for fortitude 
itself. Only after seeln9 how these Integral parts enter Into an act of forti-
tude can the exact nature of flrmjtM enl,,! be etetermlned. 
53 6 1.1., II-II, 12', c. 
54!! .1. E£hic., leet. 18. 
CHAPTER II 
THE • NTEGAAI. 'ARTS OF FORT I TUDE 
The virtues allied to fortitude as Integral parts· are absolutely necessary 
for the specific act of fortItude i tseU. Iistne qui bus fortitudo non patest 
esse.,,2 They have, therefore, a df rect relation to fl rmHa! animae ltself, and 
must be understood fn order to arrive at an understanding of ,J OJ' tts anhgf!1h 
St. Thomas apparently Jists four qualities as integral parts of fortItude, 
two for each of the separate acts.3 
For the act of attack he names two: confidence (fiduc:la). whIch pertains 
to the soul's preparation: Hut scilicet alfqul! promptum animum habeat ad 
899redfendurdt,4 and magnIficence (magnlficentfa). which pertains to the execu-
IThe Integral parts may also be potent'al parts, that is, virtues allred to 
fortitude but which do not have the difficulty of meeting the danger of death as 
their specific object. Thus, as wl1l be seen, pat'eMe has to do with control-
ling sadne~s, and as such is a ~tentia' part of fortItude" but only when the 
sadness comes from _tlng the danger of death does patience bec:omo an integrat 
part of fortitude. Therefore, the potential parts are not important In this 
treatment. 
\.1-. II-II II 128. 1 c. 
3J.k1i., But It will be shown that this classifIcation is merely an attempt 
to preserve the classic treatlt8nt of fortitude, while actuany, wIth regard to 
~ of these parts. St. Thomas means somethIng quite different. 
4.uus,. 
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ion of the act: line scit feet allquls defic' at in exeeutione II Jorum quae 
fidueialiter Inehoavlt."S Thus, the one prepares the soul to attaek by giving 
it confidence, and the other sees to the aetual exeeutlon of the aet. In per-
forming these funetions they are essential for the aet of attack itself: "Haec 
~rgo duo, 51 coarctantur ad proprlam materlam fortltudinis. scilicet ad perieula 
~rtis. erunt quasi partes integrales 'pslus, sine qui bus esse non potest.1f6 
To examine these two parts of the act of attack more closely now, they must 
be fItted Into the act of attack in its actual context. First, in the matter ot 
confidence there .'ght be the specific difficulty of a threat to one's life whld 
is a real threat and yet one that can or.y be overcome. This gives rise to 
conflicting passions of fear, In so far as the possiblHty of losing life is 
really present, and hope In so far as the possibility of emerging victorious Is 
also present. In order to generate the boldness necessary for the act of at-
tack, the fe.r RWst somehow be repressed and the hope strengthened. "Spes 
aut .. fInn. esse non potest nisi amoveatur contrarium. Quandoque enim allquls. 
quantum ex seiplo est, spararet aliquid, sed spes toll hur propter Impedimentum 
timorls; timor en'm quod8llllK)ffo sped contrarJatur.1I7 Now, when faar goes, 
security (sacuritas), which Ulaudatur ex hoe quod non tlmeat.,,8 takes Its place. 
~herafora. the fear which impedes hope must itself be Impeded by thIs security. 
When this heppens hope actually becomes confirmed. and confinued hope is nothing 
S.w.t. 
6.JJWl. 
7 
.!JWt., J ad 6. 
8JJU.t. 
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more nor less than confidence itself. "Est enlm flducia spes roborata ex allqu 
firma opinione.u9 These two. then, security and confidence, are correlative 
notions. uSecur' tas enim a malo allquo i nfert quandam fidueiam de bono op-
poslto. et • contra.IIIO One must have securi ty from fear to have confidence, 
but he must also have confidenee to have I.curi ty from fear. 
In the act of attack, however, the emphasis Is placed on confidence because 
the eet of attack Is a po&itive act. and confidence Is tho more positive aspect 
of the confidence-security correlation. 1n this sense, then, confidence is an 
integral part, a necessary condition. for the act of attack. "Et ideo fldu-
cia ••• potest nODlnar. GOndltionem v'rtutis. et propter hoc numeratur fnter 
partes fortltud'n's, non quasi vlrtus adJuncta, sed slcut pars Integralis ... 11 
By Nay of brief SUll1N1ry. then, confidence is necessary for the act of attae 
because It _kes fl na the hope that is necessary to generate the bo1dness used 
in the act of attack. 
The second integral part of the act of attaGk, lII&gniflcence, as the name 
~.1 •• II-II, J29. 6 ad 3 •. Actually, f,.ducl, , ... to go Just one step 
beyond hope Itse1f, stnce hope is hardly hope ualess It Is based on some ff r. 
opinion. Gauthier says tftat f'4MC'a r. a ~ar~lcipation of theappet)te In the 
certitude of the cognltfve faculty.-R.A. 8authler, O.P., I!Mnanlmite. (Paris, 
1951), p. 357. Also cf.! .. I., a-II, 40, 2 ad 2. Further, It must be born in 
mind that the hope. and therefore the confidence, spoken of here, Is primarily 
hope of actual success in .. dng the difficulty, not. hope In a good which may 
come as a result. 
lOCajetan, X. 69. commenting on II-I., 129, 7 c. Also cf. Gauthier, p. 
358, on this poInt. 
II 1.1., "-II, 129, 6 ad 3. 
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implies, has to do with doing great things, with activity. II(A)d magnificent-
ian pertlnet facere al iquld magnum."I! Now, obviously, in the act of attack 
the brave man must be a doer, a man of action. There must be something which 
carries him to the attack. Magnificence is such a virtue. It moves to action 
I t carries hope over from a mVelften't within the sou} to an actual movement to-
ward the object hoped for. Furtber, it carries a man into great and difficult 
undertakings. In thIs sense it is allied to and necessary for fortItude. 
IIKagnlf'centia aute. convenit cum fortitudinf in hoc quod. sicut fortltudo ten-
dit in allCJuod arduUII et difficll., ita eU_ et magniflcentla.lI13 
Now that the nature and operation of fldysla and !!I'sn!fJHntia bave been 
explained. however, a slight digression is In order to show that actually St. 
Thomas AlllNnt to subsume both of these under the greater virtue of magnanimity. I" 
That ;s, ~at both confidence and magnificence bave to offer as necessary for 
the act of attack Is already contaIned In the virtue of megnanimity. There-
fore, it is ~nanimlty whIch is really necessary for the act of attack. This 
statement needs e~lan.tlon. 
FIrst. as should be clear ff'Olll-.at has gone before. <:onfidenc.e Is not 
really a virtue at all. It was explained as a partic.ipatton of the appetite 
in the certItude of the cognitive faculty.IS As such it is merely a state of 
soul or a condition for virtue. Put in another way, in the situation of the 
12.1.B.!Jl.. 2 c. 
13.J..2.iJ!.. 4 c. 
'4rhis position 1$ confirmed by Gauthier, who shows its historical back-
ground: pp. 311-313, 358-)60. 
IS See above, p. 24. note 9. 
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act of attack there would be no re850n why a person should not lose confidence 
rather than strengthen It. There Is adequate cause for both hope and fear. 
~hat makes the balance swing In favor of hope over fear? It would be begging 
the question to say that confidence does this, since It is preelse)y the strengt~. 
ened hope which constItutes the confidence. t n other words, there must be some 
Ireallty behind hope which strengthens It into confidence. ConfIdence cannot 
~tand by f tael f. 
Second, magn. fl cenee, though treated as a vI rtue in the proper sense, has 
as Its proper object the doing of great things In a RDnetary way. "(A)d mag-
n.ficentl_ pertlnet magnos sumptus facere ad hoc quod opus magnum convenienter 
fi8t.1I16 Moreover, the magnificent man spends his money in 8 particular way: 
I ••• operar' allquld In exterior' materia: SiCUl facere domum ve' allquid 
hulusmocll.ul7 Thus. the magnlffcent man is the one who builds libraries, amuse-
ment centers, etc. for the public at his own apen.e. Now ..... l1e this is cer-
tainly concerned wIth doing great things, It S&emS far from the act of attack in 
fortitude. 
Of course. St. Thomas does explaIn that. taken in a broader sense, magnl' •• 
cence does Jnc) ude other activitIes: II • • • facer. pro quacumque actione s've 
transeat fn exteriorem meterlam ••• slve maneat In Ipso agente, s'cut intelll-
gere et vell .... 18 But taken In thi s sens., as wlJ I now be shown, it seems to 
be assumed Into the virtue of magnani.'ty. 
1~.I.' II-II, 1)4, 3 c. 
17J.!W!. 
18.J.i.!J! • 
21 
For magnanimity is the virtue which. put in the briefest possible tenms. 
des I res and does those th I ngs \Ill i en are II10S t worthy of honor. .. (D)I eendum os t 
quod p~ria materia megnanim'tatis est magnu5 honor: et ad ea tendit magnan'. 
mus quae SURt IUxlmo honor. di9n~.i .. "19 The magnanimous man does these things. 
not from d$slre of esteem. but sl.ly bec:ause they are honorable and worthy of 
human endeavor. tI(H)oe mdo magnanlmltas est ci rca honorem: ut videlicet 
studeat magnanimus fKere ea quae stint honore digna, non tamen sIc ut pro magno 
aesdmet humanum honorem.1I20 Therefor., the magnanlllDu5 man is the one who 
des' res and does great thl ngs. Now, s i nee no one undertakes such an enterpr he 
without hope because tlpros8(,;Utlc bont perttnet ad spem,u2J magnanimity above all 
pertains to the virtue of hope.22 It Is the virtue whose peculiar function it 
Is to strengthen hope and carry it Into etton: H(A)d magnanlmltatem pertfnet 
non solum tendere In magnum, sed etlam In OIInJbus vlt·tutibus magnum operari. vet 
faclendo vel qualltercumque agenclo.ul3 Clearly then., when the object of magna-
'91_1_, II-II. 129.2 c. 
2°1_1., II-It. 129, i ad 3 .. ' Cf. 129. 1; 2. ), for a fuller treatment. 
espaci.Tty of the difficulty involved In the virtue. 
21 1.1., I-II, 45. Z c. Cf.~. 8 c. 
22;autbler sUIl'I'IIarlzes St. Thomas's notion of the virtue of INgnanfmfty 
thus: "La IDB9nanlmlte est la vertu de "esperance bumaine."--Gauthier. p. 362. 
Thfs means hope as In the act of attack. where one hopes for actual success in 
the dIfficult enterprise undertaken. However, It also means a magnanimous hope 
of another kind, as in the act of endurance where hope does not have as Its 
object the possIbIlity of success 5n overcomIng the difficulty, but some other 
good _feb will result from enclurlng the difficulty. Again. however, the hope 
spoken of In the present context Is not this latter type. 
231_1., It-II, 134. 2 ad 2. 
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n i mt ty. the great bu t d iff i cu It good wh t ch Is roos t Io«>rthy of human endeavor, 
happens to be the danger of death, then the object of magnanimIty is the same as 
tit" object of the act of attack. In this case magnanImity becomes an Integral 
or' necessary part of fort i tude. 
It is necessary because it strengthens the hope necessary for the coon denc 
to attack, and It moves to actual activity. Perhaps St. Thomas himself has 
best SWlIAat-'zed the role of magnanimity In this regard: U(o)rctum est cum de 
passionibus ageretur, bonum arduum habet allquld unde attrahlt appetftum, silica 
ipsan rationem bonl, et habet aiiquld retrahens. scilIcet fpsam dlfficultatem 
adiplscendi: secundum quorum primum fnsurg; t motus sper, at secundum aJiud 
motus desperatlonls •••• Circa fllos motus appetitivos quI se habent per 
lOOdum retract'onis oportet esse virtutem aoventem fOOderantem firmantem et impel-
lantern ••• quae ff nnat animam contra desperatlonem, at impel II t 'psum ad 
prosecutionem m8gnorum secunclum ratlonem rectam: at haec est magnan.ml tas.n24 
The final conclusion, then, t/lIOuld se ... to be th.!tt it is the vIrtue of 
magnanimity, understood a$ the ability to _kG one strong tn hope and to carry 
hope into ac;tfon. which. when directing hope toward the possibll lty of success-
fully overcoming the danger of death, is the real Integral part of the act of 
attack in fortitude. 'S 
2\.I •• II-II. 161, J c. 
25, t would seem that in the act of attack fortitude as such moves against 
the dIfficulty under its evil aspect and _gnanl",. ty moves under I ts good. 
Therefore, we have two vi rtUGs convening on the same obJec:t In one act. the eet 
of attack. cf. 1.1., II-II, 129. 5 c, and also CaJetan's commentary on 129. 4 
c.--CaJetan, x, 65. 
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This however. It must be carefully noted. does not in any way change the 
basIc problem of the thesis; for magnanImity itself uses the s ... flrth.s 
animae to confl rm hope and make it operative. As stated in the above quotation 
when there Is a situation involving a difficult good whIch both attracts and 
repels the appetites, a virtue .s called for which wIll strengthen the soul to 
resist the repelling aspect and follow the attractive one. However, the ques .. 
t Ions t I II rema J ns : Where does th iss t rengthen t ng po\IJM' COIle f rOM and what I s 
its nature? In other words, It Is now clear that magnanimity, as a strengthene 
of hope, enters Into the act of attack; but It Is not at ~11 clear what makes 
magnanlfftlty a strengthener of hope, what gives IIIgnanhaity this firmness. th's 
flr;lla! tnl.... What Is the nature of this realfty whIch makes It possible to 
hope rather than to despal r .-en there Is reason for both? Thl s question must 
we I t unt 11 the conc I ud I ng chapters for an answer. 
Now It Is tlme to discuss the other tllllO virtues necessary for fortItude, 
the two used In the act of endurance. patience and perseverance. Patience Is 
that virtue which provides line dlfflcult.te Immlnentlum maforum anImus frangatur 
per tr'stit'" et decldat a sua'Mgnltudlne.u26 Perseverance is the vi rtue 
which provides Uut ex dluturna dlfflcl' 'um passlone homo non fat'getur usque ad 
hoc quod deslstat.,,27 Thus. the one guards against givIng way to sadness, 
Nhile the other guards against giving way to the weariness involved in meeting 
continued dlfflcul ty. In performing these two functions they can be essential 
2'1.1_.. II-II, 128. I c. 
27.w.t. 
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to the act of endurance in fort I tude: "Haec et 1_ duo, s i coarctantur ad prop-
riam materlam fortitudlnls, erunt partes quasi integraJes "slus.,,28 
More fully, pat'ence enables a man to beer adversities. and, therefore, 
primarily to bear welness. whfeb is the primary effect of sufferIng_ It enable~ 
~hn to possess his soul in peaee despite the onsl aught of sadness and actual 
Physical suffering. It(P)er patienti_ dicitur homo IU_ anilHm possidere, In-
~uantum r"lcltus evellet p-assJones adversitatum.. qulbus anima Inquletatur ... 29 
'(P)atientia dlcitur habere opus perfectum In adversls tol.randis: ex qui bus 
prim procedtt triad tla, q ... moderatur paUentla.u30 
On the other hand, perseveranee 'nsures flnmness: neontra difficultatem 
~I uturnltatfs.u31 It moderates SOlRe of the passions: "sci lIeet tilDOrem faU-
~atlonf. aut defectus propter diuturnltat •• ,,32 
From "at was sal dIn Chapter I about the nature of the act of endurance, 
I t can e.sn y be s... how the vi rtues of paU enee and perseverance fit I nto the 
structure of enduring.'3 
First. it was pointed out that St. Thomas conceived the act of endurance 
28.a.w. 
2\.1_, II-It t J 36. 2 ad 2. 
JOJJUt.. 2 ad J. 
311•1 .• II-II. 137. 2 ad I. 
32.1JUJl. t 2 ad 2. 
33See above. p. 10. 
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as not only the endurance of fear. but of actual sadness and even physical 
suffering. Since the endurance of sadness pertains to the virtue of patience. 
it follows that patience is necessary for the act of endurance. IIActus forti-
tudinls non solum conslsttt in hoe quod aJiquis in bono sistat contra timore! 
futurorum periculorum, sed etlan ut non deficlat propter praesentium tristltiam 
slve dolorem: at ex hac parte habat affiolt.tell ~ fortitucUne patlentia"u34 
Further, It not only has an affinity with fortitude, but it is an integral and 
fa necessary part of fortitude: Itpatientia poteat, qu.-ntum a4 aliquid sui, poni 
pars integral is fortltu41nil ••• pr-out scilicet al'quls patlente, sUltinet 
~la qU3e pertfnent ad percru)a IOOrtis.IIJS 
Second, it was also pointed out that endurance implies a Jength of time.36 
~tnc:e enduring for a length of thoo pet'tains to the virtue of perseverance, it 
follows that perseverance is a'so necessary for the act of endurance in fortl-
tude.37 
:J4 1.1 •• 11 ... 11, 136, ,. c. 
351.1 .• II-'t. 136, 4 ad 3.' CaJotan explaIns St .. ~'s mind on the 
i..,rtance of ,.tlence in t.he eet of endurance thus: ''Dtcendum est quod forti-
tudo habet pro aetu suo prlnel,ali lmmobil'ter listere et contra timores et 
contra tr"tlt'es quae In perlcul., mortis Intarvenerunt, ita quod actUI elul 
est et superatis dmorlbus et trlstitHs toth. _10irum. frmoblJiter perslstenll 
quod elt pJus quam superar. d.res. et pJus qua super.re trtstlUas. f '-
Cajetan, X, 105. 
36 See above. p. 20. 
]7At tbls point It flight be noted how thoroughly St. Thomas's notion of the 
act of endurance f n forti tucte Is Imbued wJth the C.hrlstlan vIew of II 'e. By 
the inclusion of patIence and perseverance in the act. and, in fact. by making 
them a very essential part of the act. St. Thoma .nefu •• under fortitude not 
only the supreme act of Christian existence, .rtyra, but. in a 'esser yet no 
less real degree, the whole notion of suff.rlng the trials of this 1,'. In a 
patient and persevering resignation. 
]2 
• t is also clear., however, that the I ncl ualon of ~tien" and perseverance 
in the act of endurance 40es not in anv way help to sotve the problem of this 
thesis, nanely, the nature of fl!Jd$l1 .'.. It only serves to enlarge the 
notion of the act of endurance, pointing out more clearly how It Includes being 
firm against the sadness .,icb comes from actual IMin endured for a length of 
time. aut die question of ~re tnet II nanGlS comes froat ..... ins to be solved. 
Thus, while In the fIrst cb.ter fortitude was deJineated as the virtue 
\'.bleb control. the IN.I'Oft. of feal' and boldness wllien are Involved In meeting 
the danger of death, this second chapter, In dealing with the Integral parts of 
fortitude. ""S laid stress on the control of hope and !i_ReSS In meeting the 
same danger. CaJetan s_rbe. very clearly _at has tmas far been said; 
< 
IIUnde fortItude, llcet sit In irascibill. ia qua sunt timor at audac •• , exigit 
tamen lIOdificatam spera et tristithn ad Ktuca sucrum perfectionem. Et prop-
terea vocantur aDdi ficantia haec pert .. 'ntegrale.. it per haec patet quod 
non superflue. sed neoes.ario multipflcantur hulusmodl morales disposition •• et 
h.bltus: ui sclJ leet In qu.Ubet Mter'a propria vIrtue cuaa conditionlbus 
requlslUs inven.atur, quasi tot_ cum suis partfbus heterogenels.1I38 
However. the point to be made here Is that, although these integral parts 
may be ~Nry parts of the vt rtve of forti tude. they are onl V necessary 'n 
the se"se that forti tude involves not only t .... control of fear and boldness, but 
also of hope and sadness. That as, the integra. ,.rt5 do not make the control 
of fear and boldness posslb'e. Therefore. they do not constitute the flrm.ta. 
anla of fortitude. They .rely reemph.lze the fact that tbere must be a 
38 CaJetan, X, 56. 
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power within the soul which not only has the firmness to repress fear and en-
g~lder boldness, but also to repress sadness and strengthen hope. What this 
power consists in will have to be determined later. 
By way of swa:nary. ROW, bowever. of all that has been discussed in the las 
t\toO chapters, J t would be well to draw out as concrete.lv as possible the es-
senti al content of bottl the act of attack aM the act ·of endurance. 
The act of attack mIght be termed the typical soidier's virtue. though not 
necessarily strlctlv confined to soldiers. By wav of example. suppose the cas~ 
of a soldier on D Day facing the prospect of making a landing on the Normandy 
COiils,tS. He I. still on the EngUsh coast. Suppose that he fs gtven the 
choice of remaIning safelV in Inghand or of goIng with the landing forces. 
He fs acutelv aware of the situation. He knows fuJI well that thousands 
wiJ J dIe on that beachhead, and that he may be one of them. This thought 
strikes fear Into his heart. for he naturallv doe. not want to die. On the 
otber hand, he also knows fuU we11 that manv thousands wtJJ not die. Whether 
or not the bat t J e I s won, MAV wi' 1 escape death; and he can eas II y be one of 
thea. Th.s give, a real basis 'for hope. further. be also realizes that he 
has much to be confIdent In. The a'r foree will heevi IV bomb enemy coastal 
Instalh.tion., and the navy will shell them. The entIre pJan has been well 
J aid. lie h.mself will be well af'll8d. There Is much to be confident In. 
There I s a verV real poss i blli tv tltat he may emerge vi etcr i GUS. 
But stilI, there 15 the real posslbilitV that he mav not, that his anmy 
may be defeated and that be mav dIe. H •• ertheless, he secures hImself against 
! 
this fear. Fastening uport tbe hope of success. he chooses to relv upon the 
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confidence he has In the arnay, navy. and air force,39 and tn his own competence 
las a soldier. 
He chooses to step down into the landIng barge and sets out Kross the 
~hannel. As he does so, he feels a certain spi ri t of boldness come over him. 
. 40 
together with certain feelings of anger at the enemy. In this frame of mind 
he sets out for the battle. 
This is the act of attack .IS St. Thomas conceived It.41 But the question, 
~aln. is; Why did this sold'er choose to do what he dfd? Another soldier 
under exactly the same circumstances might have chosen the opposite. 
The act of endurance, though. is a quite different matter. It Is the 
martyr's virtue. Suppose now, again by wy of example, an early Christian, say 
during the reign of Nero.42 He sits in his prIson ceil. In. few minutes he 
wll' be called before the state officials and asked to abjure his religion. He 
knows full we11 that by the II,.le Kt of offering some incense to an Idol he cal 
save his own Ii fe. He aho knows that, I f he refuses, his 1 ivi ng body will be 
''''he confidence one poslels.es In the act of attack. need not be totally a 
confidence in self.. It can also be founded on other exterior grounds. On thl 
point see I.T., 11-.1, 119, 6 ad I; and .1110 1.11, 40, 5 c. 
"Anger, too, depends on hope: "Nullu, irascitur nisi Iparens vlndlctum. ll-11-1-, ,-,. f 48, t c. 
41 However, certa. n other 81 aments of th is act will appear 'n the next 
chapters. The present is meant as a summary of what has already been said. 
4~b martyrdom Involves the supernatural, the act Is treated here from 
a phllosophl"1 point of view. 
3S 
used as a human torch to Ught the E.eror's garden party tonight. 
In this ease, on his own decisIon rests the certaInty of life and death. 
If he abjures, he Jives; If he remains true to the Faith, be dIes. There is a 
sound bas I s of hope for his II fe and of fear for I ts loss, and he fee Is the 
surge of both these AIOveRIents. As the jar Jer approac:hes, he realizes the 
decision "It be made; and It Is. He ehooses to remain true to the Faith. 
At that moment his fear turns Into sadness; for the pain of his fIery 
marty~ though still hours away, is In a very rea' psychological sense 
actually upon him In all its terrible long-drawn-out rea' Ity. From that IDOEIlent 
51 nee all hope of dellveranc:e I I gone, his martyrdom is no longer future but 
present. 
This act, carried Into execution, of course, in Ktual death, is the Kt of 
endurance In its fu11est sense. But the question arises again: Exaetly""y 
did this man choose to die rather than to live? Another men In exaetly the 
s .. et rcunatanees m'ght heve chosen the opposi te. 
Thi 5 quest I on of ..my wtll be answered I n the foll owl ng chapters. both for 
the act of attac:k and for that of enduranc:e. Before going on, however, it 
should be pointed out AIOre clearly ""at seems to be the fundamental difference 
bettraen these two acts of the same vI rtue. Though in both there I s a very rea' 
danger of death, In the act of attack there is a very real possibility of life 
even after the cholc:e of attac:k Is made. and this choice is made with the reali-
zation that this Is so. But in the act of endurance, once the choiee has been 
made there is no longer any possibility of life as long as the choice remains 
operative. There Is only endurance of suff.rlng. And the c:holc:e to endure 
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was made wi th the fu 11 ro I i zatJ on that thf s was so. 
From this basic dlfferen.;e in the structure of the ttl«) acts, It can readllv 
be seen why the act of endurance U'llst be eonsicier-ed the principal act of forti-
tude. However. It can also be seen that even in the act of attack a heroic 
degree of nOla!! aol", is needed. 
CHAPTER .&1 
REASON AND PASSIONS IN FORTITUDE 
From what has been said in the last two chapters It is obvious that the 
Flrmitas ;mimat of the two acts of fortitude will differ in some respects at 
east. and therefore each act must be consIdered separately_ However, though 
pperating tn at dIfferent m.IlIller in dtese t., acts, the U tel~. ,nhM. of both 
s essentially the same. as wIll be shown. 
Now that the actual structure of the tllilO acts has beet. drawn out, it is 
~ces$4ry to attempt a solutl.n to the basic probl_ of the thesis: What makes 
Fortitude possible? The gl"OUnd\oDrk wIll be laid in this dl.iIpter, and the final 
~o'ution made fn the next. 
ftore specifIcally, I n the act of attaek. \1Ilat makes it po.ss' ble for a man 
",0 deliberately choose not only to face but actively to go out to meet the danger 
:>f losing his tife? LikewIse, In the act of endurance., ""'at Is it that enables 
it man to c:hoose to endure a painful death without going to pieces before the fear 
pad .... s., and ~tu.1 physical pain involved? 
I t wIll be well to begin an answer by pointing out what does not constitute 
~hls f'raU •• Imae. This involves a consideratIon of the role of the p.ssion!~ 
For, particularly in the act of attack. it might seem that tit.!D!sas IOi. con-
~ists in nothing more than the movements of hope and audacity which carry a 
l>erson forward to the attack. This, however, cannot be. 
First, to say tbis ~ld be to deny the entire thomistic concept of moral 
37 
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virtue in which virtue I. a strictly moral or human actIvity consIsting In human 
lacts. And human acts are acts tIllch are not placed by passion but by reason an< 
~ree will: "III .. solae actiones vacantur proprl. humanae, quorum hOll) est 
~inus. Est autem hooo dominus suorum actUUl1t per rat;onem et voluntatem. 
~nde et lIOOr .. arbltrium esse dicitur facultat voluntatis et rationis. IU. 
~rgo actiones proprie humanae dlcuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberate procedunt.al 
This Is also true. tIterofore~ I)~ ft)rtftude. And this Is exaetly Wlat St. 
rhomes means to say ""en he states: IlHoc autem ad fortttudinem mentis pertlnet, 
~uod lnflrmitatem ce! ... '~ fc:ther f~rat.H2 By.l!!!l. here is to be understood 
~be princIple of • huatan acu ..... ns nominat fJlud genus potentf ... quae est 
prln<:ipha i Jlor .. ac:tuUIII. quorutD hotno est docalnus. qui proprle dlcuntur human-
~.,,3 Therefore,' t follows that whatever roJe the passions fRIght play In the 
act of fortitude, they ... at play a subordinate role In _Ich they are controlled 
~ reason and wi U. For reason must be the prlncl,le of every hUllan act. 
These ideas will be applfed now to the two acts of fortitude. First, In 
the act of attack. though pass'on does admittedly play an Ift1lOrtant role. It 
cannot be the essenUal constItuent of the act, the .... on beIng that It is not 
a vI rtue If it proceeds "propter impet .. passlonls ... 4 Its role, rather, must 
be explaIned as one In .Jeh it Is used as an Instrument of manls higher fa<;Ul. 
I 1.1. J '-II, I, I e. 
~.I.~ II-II. l2), J ad I. 
3s. T, •• I-H, SS, ,. c. 
-- .. 
4!.r •• It-II, 12). J ad 2. 
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ies, reason and wi J I t for as St. Thomas says: "natae sunt passlones rationl 
!>bedi re,,115 
for this ruson St. Thomas maintains that, should the passion of boldness 
~ctually cause an act of attack, the act would not be an act of fortitude at all. 
his could, indeed, happen if for some reason boldness were so strong before the 
~ecision to attack that it influenced the wll) to attack without sufficient 
~ellberaUon. The Idea here 1$ that In such a case reason would be deprived of 
ts proper funetlon. 6 In the formation of an act of attack the mind must be 
free to consider with tranquil ltV Nutt is to be done. Thus. though the passions 
t)f hope. boldness, and fear are being experIenced before the decision to attack, 
they cannot influence the actual choice one '"y or another.7 That Is, for a 
full act of attack In Its highest sense, ruson must be able to view this danger 
ogether with Its possibility of death and of victory, and, in the light of some 
Cons.clerations other than the passfons Involved, choose either to attack or not 
.. 0 att_k. But the IMslions themselves cannot be the powers which Influence 
this choice. St. Thomas states 'thIs very clearly In speaking of the difference 
between the truly brave man • attacks and the man who acts simply on the 
s 1.1., I-II. 56. 4 c. 
'n.e supposition here is that the act does not proceed from habit. It is 
fa que~tion of forming a sIngle act. 
7ttowver, the passions may and often do Influence the will to the extent 
that they influence It to decide to deliberate about the situation. In this 
sense St. Thomas says that n(T)llIDr comcllfaUvos facft.H-.l.I., I-It. lt4, 2 c. 
~he passIons often Incite a person to consider what he shoulrd do, and this Is 
good. 
iJ1l)uJse of passion: "Sed ratio est dlscursiva omnium quae afferent dIfficult ... 
it ideo fortes, qui ex iudJeio ratlonls aggredfuntur perleuls, tn 
rineipio videntur remissi: quia non passi, sed ~ deliberations debita 89gre-
iuntur •••• Audilees autem. propter solam aestlmatlonem facientem spem et 
ludentem tlmor •• ,,8 
On the other hand, once the. choice to attack has been Mde, then passion 
pI., it very important role. The pBsion of fear, of course, must sonehow 
e reduced to it minllDUlll; and this can be done for the followIng reason: II(S)U 
iace. aut_ vol untati, Inquantum appeti tus inferior obedlt rat I on I: uncle homo 
test tlD)reIt repel Jere.lI' Further, the passions of hope and boldness must be 
urther engendered and used" This's necessary because the will's choice flows 
ver 'nto activity only through the _,UUIl of the passions, ""iebare the actual 
vers of b..-o activity: U'Jcut In nobis ratio universal is movet _dlante 
Ita appetltus. qui dlcltur valUAtes, movet In nobis 
lante appatl tu sensltivo; qnde proxl .. mottvWR corporis in nobis est 
titus MftIltlvus.uJO 
Thus. the choIce to attack flows Into actual corpora' actlvi ty only through 
the pe.slons of hope and bohlness. Noble, explaInIng this, states: "eeUe 
/ ' art conslste dans un renforcement ..... I'energle volonteire. a I' instance de la 
/ ~ 
Islon RDr.l., quand, en fMe des cUffic:ultes de I'aetron et surtout de Pacti 
\.1-. I-II, 45. 4 c. The .,rd auftiI. refers to those who act from 
ssion and not from deli berate choice .. 
\.1.. I-II, 42, 4 c. 
10 5.1., I-II, 20, I ad J. See also .t-II, 127, I ad 2, for a statement of 
boldness preelpitates quick action. 
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~ui veut $tre aussr grande et auss' parfaite que possible, 11 taut d:ployer un 
....... I / / 11 
~urcroit d'ardeur, de tenacite violente 8t d
'
indomptable esperance." 
Further, other passions. primartly anger, can also be used to help carry out 
~he decision to attack. 1'(Q)uia appetrtus sensitivus movetur per imperium 
Irationis ad hoc quod cooperatur ad pr~tius agend~ Idclrco ponebant et ir. 
~t alias passiones anlmae assumendas esse vi rtuos.s m:)deratas secundum i.rha 
rationi,.11. 2 
I n SUllltary, thoa, r n the ac.t of at tack there are two general ideas to be 
lOted about the I nteraction of reason and the passions: FI rst, there must be a 
cuntroJ over the passions of fear, hope, and boldness (also anger, etc.) will Ie 
del'beration goes on, a control which prevents these passions from Influencing 
the outcome of this deliberation. Second, once the choice to attack has been 
made, these same passions raast be controlled In such a way that fear is re.-
pressed and hope and boldness are made operative as reinforcers of the act. 
Thh is suanarlzed by St. ThoIIa6 blmsel f: tI(,.)esio praeveniens i ud'cium 
rationis. sl In animo praevaleat ut el con$antiatur, Impedit consllium et ludf-
chan ratlonls. SI vero sequatur. quasi ex ratiOM _mpe.·ate. adjuvat ad 
exequendum i ... rfum rationls.ttl , 
In the act of endurance. however. the situation is sonaewhat different from 
that in the act of attack. Here. be for. the cUloice to endur., the passions of 
hn 
11 ... 0• Nobl., 0.' .. .w. flith'll' SI!!1!1.xJ.lINElie (Paris, 1932), II, 268. 
1\.1 .• II-II, 123. 10 c. 
I~.l .• I-II, 59. 2 ad 3. 
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fear and sadness must be repre.ssed to the extent that del i beret ion can go on 
with equilIbrium. In this respect the acts of endurance and attack are the 
same, except that to preserve this equll fbrium in del iberating about an act of 
endurance would be much mor~ difficult because the passions pull In onJy one 
direction. In attack the passIon of fear is mora than baJanced by the passions 
of hope and bol dness. In enduraocfJ thi sis not so. Fear and sadness are not 
balanced by the hope of success. Further. fear and sadness are experienced as 
more fnninent, and therefore. the B)re terri ble. 
Once the <:hoI ce to endure has: been made, the dl fferences ~tween attack and 
enduc·ance beccIcae even more lQiiU'''ked. '~r In the act of enduraneeno passicm can 
be enlisted to aId .. because from that moment the only experiences present WlUld 
be the passIon of sadness and actual physical pain, and these move contrary to 
the choice itse1f. 
Of course, a passion that ~'d carry the will act Into external activity, 
as hope and boldness in the act of attack, Is not needed in endurance be~ause no 
exterior activIty Is called for. The aet of eAch,ranee in itself Is one of 
suffering. eonslst'ng In an 'nterior adhereaee. a negatIve refusal to go to 
pieces under suffertng. It Is not a positive decisIon to do something, exeept 
In SO far as the end for __ feb It is done Is posItIve. tn this sense St. 
Thomas statess "Nut ta enl. vol umus et operanaar absque passione, per solam 
eleetionenll ut maxlme patet In his In qulbus ratIo renltltur pass'onl.1t14 In 
other words, when reason Is opposed by passion, as in the act of endurance, it 
is possible for the will alone to place the act. This last statement in no way 
14 . 1.1., '-'I. 10, 3 ad 3. 
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eontradfets what was stated before about passion being necessary to carry tbe 
wi Il's act into execution. The ruson is that In the passage quoted above 
there Is no question of exterior activity but simply of a decision, as in the ac 
of endurance, to remain firm and unmoved. 1S Passion Is needed only when there 
is a question of bodily activity_ 
This dec i s I on to r_1 n f i J'lft and Uf'lllllC)ved. though i t does not i nvol ve bod II y 
activity flOWing from the passions, nevertheless does demancI intense Interior 
activity of another kind. Obviously, this refusal to gIve way to the pain and 
sufferIng Involved, espectalty ... en there is no pleasure to counteract that 
sufferIng, while it does I .. ly a pasllv'ty, also .. ..,Ues an I ntense activity of 
the soul "fortlss'. Inh.rentis bono.uJ6 
Gut the poi nt to be ..... here is that. after the chol ce to endure. pass. on 
cannot be used in any positive way. It was In this sense that St. Thomas saleh 
"(h)um: aetum soJa ratIo per Be feelt. Jll7 
Thus, the obvious genera1 conclusion with regard to the passions in en act 
of fortitude is that at most they can positively participate, as in the act of 
attack. while In the act of endurance they do not even positively participate in 
tSNoble upllcltly interprets the passage quoted in this same way, as re-
ferred to an Interior act of the will to struggle (renitltur) against passion.-
H.D. Noble, O.P., "Coament la passion enjale Ja votont4,U Divus ThoMs e!~., 
III (J926) 646. 
16,1.1 •• II-II, 123. 6 ad 2. CaJetan develops this notion ful1y In hIs 
COI'IIDIitntary on the same passage. an4 concludes: Hlta quod flrmiter et hanobil iter 
patl In corpore orltur ex f'naiter at ImmobfJlter agere ',slus ani... it 
propterea sustlnere ex parte animae eonslstlt in agere, lieet ex parte corporis 
dieat pad .U •• CaJetan, X, 16. 
17 1.1., II-II, 123, 10 ad 3. 
the act. The essential constituents of .,ir.'tt' !nlmae, then, are necessarily 
contained In the rational part of man. 18 
HoItIever, since this tIDBit. ani!!! ...... ,eb must come from the rational part 
f man Is so Intimately bound up with the passions, either controlling the. or 
using t~ since, In fact, the essential function of {inllt', animal ,. to 
i~e reason·, rule upon the passions, and since it Is the passions which tend 
to .... this ,f'l1Iital M'., It Is necessary to discuss now St. Thomas's 
theory of the exact way tn which the passIons and the rational part ot man 'nter 
act. Specffleally, sInce ultimately the choice of an act of fortitude rests tn 
the wi II, It • s necessary to know how the pass I ons can i nfl uenee the wi II and 
the wi l' can r nf I uence the pass Ions. 
'Irst. the passIons can Influence the wilt in an act of fortitude. The 
asslons can get at the will only through the intellect. Therefore, 'ny Influ-
nee 1IUSt first be on the intellect Itself. More speciffcally, when there is 
uestfon of a practical judgment or decision to be .. , pass ton ean influence 
fts Influence on the practical Intellect, or the practical 
"Pass'o appetftus sensftlvf movet voluntatem ex e, parte qua 
luntas mctv8tur ab obfectol fnquantum scilicet homo aBquallter dlspositus per 
sloa., iudlcat allquld esse conveniens et bonum quod extra passronem exlsten 
l~r. It Is true that some men are naturally more disposed to fortit 
than others. "Nee tamen est contra rationem vi rtutis quod ex natural i c:Gq)Jexl 
aJlquls habeat naturalem inc:linationem ad virtJltem.u •• S.! •• II-II, 123. t ad 
• Noble aMPlalns thts predispositIon: ··Ces predlsposltTons sont d·ordre 
sloJoglque (Jes organl .. , vlgoureux). mats aussl d·ordre psychlque (cohe"renc 
s repNsentatfons, p~titude et clarte'du Jugement. energle volontafre).u-
homes Aquinas. Js!!D! T~l9Srwa • .L!. fore. ll-ll. 111-ISP. trans. J.D. F'olgber 
.P •• ed. La Revue~ais eunes. commentary by H.D. Noble. 0.'. (Parts, 1926), p. 
as. 
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iudlcaret.,,19 To further eJrqtJafn dds experlenee St. Thomas appeals to 
rlstotle's dictum, u(Q.)ual is unusquisque est, taIls finis videtur ef .,,20 In 
ther l«)rds, I f a person I 5 fll)Veci by the pass. on of fear, for examp Ie, he wi 11 
be so influenced by that passion that he will tend to judge that to flee Is a 
good thing_ On the other hand, If he Is moved by the passion of boldness, he 
III tend to Judge that to attack is a good thing. Obviously, then, the truly 
brave man IlUlt be able to keep this passional element out of his practical Jud9* 
Itore particularly. pa,.lon tends to Influence prac.tical judgments In t\'ID 
First, it tends to distract the attention away f~ other considerations 
Man's OM, and though he has these two specifically different 
rs. reascm and passion, both are rooted in the , .. soul. Further, his 
rfence fa one. He cannot at the same time be attending to both passion and 
rational conslcleratlons. uPasslo appetl tus sensltlv' non pot.st dl recte trahe 
ut ADVere voluntatem, sed Indlrecte potest. It hoc dupJleSter. Uno quldem 
, .... ndum qu .... abstractionera. C .. eni. omnes potenti .. animae In una 
slJent',.. IJftlmae radlcentur, neceRe est quod quando una potent'a Intendltur In 
uo actu, altera In suo aetu rerafttatur, vel eUara totaliter impedlatur • .,21 
1\.1_. '_II, 10, J c_ 
20 1-1., 1 •• 1, 9, Z CJ and also sa, J c. 
211_1 .• I-II, 77. I e. Only in exceptional cases does passion completely 
arry away the attention, and therefore the power to del iberate; but that this 
oaaethnes happens I. beyond dispute' HContfnglt etlan quandoque quod motU! 
ppetltus sensltlvi subtto concftatur ad apprehenslonem imaginatlonl! vel sensus 
t tunc ille mtus est praeter imperium ratlonls.u-l.T., 17, 7 c. However, St 
hamas goes on to say: H(Q.)uamvis potulsset ia.,edl ri i ratione 51 praevl dl sset.· 
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Clearly. then, another function of if rmlsv Ml,e wouJd be to prevent this 
tendency of passion from becoming too intense. 
The second, and closely related, way that passion tends to influence the 
practical Judgement Is as follows: Passion, of its nature. strongly moves and 
controls the Imagination. Jut the.xl.! M,t!!HSfya Judges on the basis of the 
data furnished by the .... glnatlon. The practical Int-eUKt, in turn, Judges on 
the ba.s of the data furnished by the.x.La "Itl.S'Y'. Therefore, 411 tlmate')', 
t .... data on -nlch the practical intell.ct judges has bean Influenced by the 
passions workIng through the _cU .. of laaglnatlon. H .... cUtur enlll h.diclum 
at apprehensio ratlonil propter vehement ... t inordinataa apprehenslonem 
lmaglnatlonis, at ludlc'ua vfrtutis aest.mat'vae: ut patet In amentibus. 
Manlfestura est aut_ quod ,".'_ appetitus lensltlv' sequitur lmaglnatlon's 
apprebenslo. et Judlc'um .. stl.tly_: sleut etl_ cUsposJtlonem I 'nguae 
sequitur ludleluaa gUltus. Uncle videmus quod homines in allqua passione u-
Istent's, non facile imaglnationem avertunt ab his cIrca quae affleiuntur. Und~ 
per QOnsecruens ludlelUil ratlonls pier ....... lequltur p.sionem appetl tus sensf· 
tlvl. at per consequens mtus vohmtatls, qui natus est sequl Judicium ration-
Is ... 22 
This does not, of course, _an to say that passion working through the 
Imagination so binds up and '~s the practIcal Intellect that deliberation 
beCOllH f..,.slble. Rather, ... t nappens Is sOIMIthlng like this: There are 
'.~ practicel syllogS .. fonrIed.. Each has a unIversal proposal stating a 
dlffer-ent good. One states the good of reason, the other the flood of passion. 
~.I., I-II, 77, I c. 
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rhus, in forti tude, one might state, 110. fff cutty should be met." The other 
~i9ht state. HDifficulty should be fled." For each there \\Ould be the propo-
sitloil, HBut thts Is a difficulty." Then, two different conclusions would be 
ormed. Under the rational propositIon that difficulties should be met, the 
::onclusion fol'l'D8d .'ght be, trrhis difficulty should be met." Under the passion-
~, proposition that dl.ffl.culties should be fled, tbe conclusion formed· might be, 
'Thts diffIculty should be fJcd. it Now. If passion Is strollg enough, If it so 
~lors the Imagination, It could I.ede the rational conclusion, 'Jfhis difficulty 
.hould be flet.1I Passion would tend to raake the second practical judgment the 
td timete practical J..,dgment. The wn J would accept the conclusion, "This 
diffIculty should be fled."ll 
Thus, In forthude, the. passions could 50 captivate the attention and so 
cont~l the imagination that a person might judge that it is better for bim to 
Jtee than either to attack or to endure. Or. on the other hand, other passions, 
~Jclnes. for e.xampJ., MIght work fn the same way to l10Ve him to attack when the 
rational good demands that he do not attaek. It Is the function of fi mit.! 
an'" to prevent these aberrations. Clearly, I t must do so by control over 
the attention and over tbe passional influence on the iugfnatlon. 24 
13St .. Thomas illustrate. this proce.s very clearly when speaking of another 
type of act; "Phiiosophul dicit in VII Ethic, quod syl10gismus fncontinentls 
~abet quatuor p~lltiones. duas universalel: quarum una est ratlonis, put a 
~uJJam forn'eatJonem else commlteAdam; aJia est passlonls, puta deleetatronem 
~s5e sectan4_. Passlo fshur I .gat ratlonem ne assumat e·t concludat sub prfnllu 
~nde ea durante, assumlt et concludit sub secunda,H ... !.!., ,.", 77. 2 ad 4. 
241t would seem that attention also Is bound up with the Imagination, so 
that control of the Imagination tends also to control attention. 
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fort i tude N)U I d be i mposs I b Ie. aut the will does have power ow.. the pass Ions. 
'Posi to quod ratio si t Jlgataper pass'o.nea, ne~sse est quod sequatur perversa 
electlo; sed in potestate vohmtatis est hoc ligamen rationis expel1ere.1I2S 
How. then, is this control exercised? There .1". various ways, depending Or 
the particular relationship of a particular passion wi th a partic.ular act of the 
~i) J. 
Thus, it sometImes happens that the moveatent of passion naturally corres-
ponds to that of the wi II. 1I(l)n Idem ten4at bonum quancloque uterque ."etitus 
sed dlff.runt penes diversum lIOdum .tppetendl.u26 Thus, In the ~t of attack 
there I s a natural movement of hope and hoJ dness I n the same direct I on as the 
wi II's Gbol ee to attack. • n thi $ case there is no probl em of control over the 
passIons. 
However, ~en both passion and will are not already t~td'ng toward the same 
object, the situation Is changedi Sometimes in this case it Is possible for thE 
will to simply choose to use a passion. It c:ormaands the activity of the passlor 
'per tROd. electionls: quando scilicet homo ex ludlclo radonls ellglt aliqua 
passlone. ut p~tlus operetur. c.ooperante appethu sensitlvo,,1127 
2s,g. IfAl.2, :5, I o. 
2'.b lit-, 22, 4 ad 4. 
271.1 .• I-II. 24, 3 ad J .. 
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Of course, the situation '5 not $0 simple. It Is not merely a question of 
decIding to use a passion. The reason Is that the wtll can never exercise 
complete control over the passions. The basic reason for this is that a passJo~ 
has two constItutive principles, the soul and the body. To have perfect cont-
rol over the passIons, then, the wfll ~uld need complete control over both as-
pects of passion. This I t does not have. "(A)d f ntell 'Senduaa quaIl ter actus 
appetltus sensltivl suOdatur Imperio ration's, oportet c.onsiderare qual iter sit 
In potestate no$tr.. Est autem sciendum quod appatitus senaitivus In hoe 
differt ab appetftu inteJlect'vo, q,.i dlcftur voluntas, quod appetltus aensltl-
vus est virtu. organl corporal is, non autem voluntas. Omnis autem actus vir-
tuth utentls organo corpora". ctependGt non solum ex potentia animae, sed etJam 
ex corporalls organf dlsposltione •••• Uncle at actus appethus senlitivl non 
101 um dependet ex vi appetitive. sed etian ex dlsposl tlone corporls.1I2S 
Thus, the will, a spiritual power, cannot exercise direct control over the 
bodily part of JUlsslon, and therefore does not have complete control over the 
movements of pas5ion.29 
There are. hoNeve,. I nd i reo t ways by ""I ch the will can cont FO J the bod n y 
~nt of passion, for exatllP1e. by removing the e.ause of the sensatIon which 
causes passion. Applied to the passion of boldness, St. Thomas says that the 
2\.1 .• I-i., 17. 7 c. 
29"OPalftas autem et dhposltlo corporis non subJacet iq»erJo ratlonls. 
It Ideo ex hac parte Impeditur quln motus sensltlvl appetttus total Iter subdatur 
'..,erlo ,ationis.It-I.I., I-II, 17. 7 c. St. l'homas explains the control thus: 
H(R)atlc praeest irasclbiJ i et coneupiscibill non princ.lpatu despotlco, qui est 
dofninl ad servum, sed prlncipatu politico aut regal J. qui est ad lIberos, quI 
non total Iter subduntur InperJo."-.I.2.l.s1. 
so 
wiJ J can Inftuence the bodily coq)Onent of boldness by making use of these 
thfngs W1lch cause ltc:alldltatem clrc:.a eor.H10 And he mentions tn.t drinking 
wine mIght provide the necessary warmth around the heart. 
Ifowever, this Indirect control of the body s.-. to be .. minor aspect of 
the wlllls power to choose th. use of a passion. The -Jor aspect lies In the 
will's power to influence the aspect of passion said to be In the soul. H0w-
ever, even here there does not seem to be dl teet control. The "II J I seems to 
control this aspect of passion by a process the reverse of that by which passJon 
tends to control the will. That is. the will by controlling the operations of 
the mf nd ca control the use of the Imagination, and, through the imagf nation. 
of the pass'ons themselves.. "Apprehenslo autem imaginatlonis cum sit partl. 
cularls. regulatur ab apprehensione ratlonis quae est universal is. sicut vlrtus 
activa partfcularls a virtute active universalf. Et Ideo ex ista parte, actus 
appethus sensltivl subJacet ',.erio ratlonls.,,)t 
Thus. by exerclsl"9 control oyer the thougtE process the wiJ J ean exercise 
control OVer the imagination. and therefore also over the passions. St .. Thomas 
expJalns In detail how this takes place In the eet of attack, \'4here It Is 
especially necessary to be able to COIIIIiind the use of tM passions$ 
)0 4S 1.1 ... ,.", ,) c. 
311.1_, I-II, 17. 7 c. Cf. _1$0 I.t., 30, 3 ad). Hote that the lmagina 
tlon pJars an extremely vital role in the Interplay of the wn I and the passions 
The Imagination. in fact. seems in large measure to be the battleground of the 
war which goes on between the two. Whichever gains control of the Imagination 
tends to win. 
51 
(A)udaei. eonsequitur spam, et contrariatur tlmorl: unde qU~lDque 
nata aunt e ....... spam, veJ excluder. tinor •• sunt causa audaeiae. 
Ix parte qufdera eppetltlvl motus, qui sequitur apprehensioneal. provo-
<:atur spes caul'" audK'am. per .. quae fachmt nos Hst'mar. quod 
POlS I bile sft Hlp.rei victor'.. vel secundum proprl. potentJ_ 
s'cut forUtudo corporis, eMperhmtia in perl cui Is. multltudo pecunia-
rum. et all. huiusmodl; s've per potentram .f'orum, slcut multItude 
.dcorum vel quGrWI)CUIIqUO auxl Jiarlum. at praec'pue ., homo eonfidat 
de auxl Jlo divino; unde iJ If quI Ie bene habent ad dlvl"., audaciores 
sunt ••• Timr eutEII excludi tur, sec:undurI istum flI04um, per remotfonem 
terrlblJ lum approplnquantlum: puta quia horao non habet 'nimleos, quia 
null I nocutt, quia non vlclet aliquh' perfcuha i_I nero.If)! 
In other tllDrds, hope is generated by the wll 1'5 enoice to make the inteiJeet 
think about the hopeful aspect of the situation, ..... fear Is simultaneously ex-
~lucIed by the wn PI eboloe to make the intel1ec:t think ebout those things """eb 
Jessen fear. IlHoc aU_ .,Ulbet eJeperiri potelt tn .. ipso; appllc:an40 enlm 
allquas un'verHles conal.ratlones, mitlgatur Jr. aut timor aut aUquhl bulus-
,*1. vel eUam "wUgatur.n33 
It would s .... then. dtat fn chooal ng to attRk the will simuJtaneou$ly 
calls forth tbe ~ssa,.y boldness by concentrating the mind's attention on the 
hopeful a'. of the 51 twation. The mind's thinking about thoae things tfA-dch 
featse hope fll Is the '1JIgIMtion,wt th hopeful images. and thereby the paSsion 
~f hope Itself i. aroused. and through hope bol<lnea. also. ' ••• Ion might be 
further aroused by conditionl n9 the body wi th a 11 ttl. wi ne. 
Obviously, ~r, this HAnot be the case with the act of encluranee. 
First. nothing can be done about the bodily component of the JMssfon involve4 
)~.l •• I-I •• 45. 3 o. 
)3 Ch 1.1.. I-I. VI. 3 c.. 
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because to remove the body from the eau.se of pal n wou I d be to destroy the s hue-
tion of the eet of etlduranc:e I tse1f. Second. the will cannot elect to use 
passion because it is essential to the Kt of endurance that no passion be used 
to help the ct. Rather, because of the nature of the act, it is not possIble 
to eHel t the belp of passion. It would seem that the imagination ts completel 
swept away by passion, espeelalty by the patn of sense.3)a The question 
presents Itself, then, of how It is possible to prevent the wlU from being 
completely swept .way. 
lefore this questiem can be answered It is necessary to explain one final 
way in wh i cb the will can I nf I uenc::e the pass Ions. Th i sis by redundance: "per 
mod\ll redundenU.s quia scilicet, cum superior pars ani .. 'ntense movetur in 
al'quid, sequitur mtum elus ed_ par. Inferior. It sic pestlo .'stens cons. 
quenter In .,.titu sensltlvo. est sigma Intenslonfs voluntatls.u )4 ThuI, the 
will, by the I ntenslty of I tl Kt, seems to over') ow I nto the sense powers and 
cause the leaa fIlOV'elIt8nt In th •• JS 
AppIIe4 to tbe act of attack, this \ll)uld _an that If for some reason at 
person Intensely willed to attack. Utls desire tn the will would elicit a 
correspond I ng des f re on the sense 1 eve' • Appl. eel to the .act of endurance, 
'las. page 19 .. footnote ltg, for ThoMs's r .. lOftlng on this point. 
~; • .I.. I-a. J 24, ) ad 1. By the I ntensf ty of • wI' 1 act is meant to be 
i ncl ucted the h' gher emot I ons consequent on a wtl tact. Cf« 1I.Y.!.t. II 26, 9 ad 5 
!t !!!l.. J I. ). 
)SRedundance also .... to work through t .... IlIJ8glnation. The v.me.nce of 
a wI I J act causes changes In the ImaginatIon. This Is Nobl.'s opinlon--H.D. I I \ Noble, 0.'., lICclmen~ 1. Volonte i_ite Ou Rafrene Ja 'asslon,H IU!!!.bl Sc'8ftC4 s 
EblJ.osoelJhM .11 Jb!O!SWIIM!h XVII (1928), ,88. 
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ver, the pl~ture 'S again quite different. for regardless of the Intensfty 
f the will's act, the passIon of fear and the sadness, plus the &ense pain, are 
great that no positive redundance can take p'aee. Reason alone can place 
The question c.omes back again, then, of how it is 
sible for the wtll to prevent Itself from being swept away by the passions. 
The answer does seem to 1 Ie in • second aspect of the notion of redundance 
feh at'ght be ter'JlWld negative redundMCe. In another passage St. Thorau 
tat ns redundance thuss u(i)a vi ri bus superior' bus fit redundantia in i n'eri-
res: eum ad .,tUII voluntaUs Intenswa: sequitur ,asslo In sensuaU appetitu, et 
Intensa contemplat'Ofte retrahentur vel Impedluntur vires anima1es a suis 
ctl bus.,,)6 The Important words here .,. the Jast: Uretrahantur vel hapedl-
tur vires anl .. ,.s a su.s actlbus." thIs Is what might be called negative 
The pa$sage Indicates tMt tfMat happens fs not that post tlve 
sslons are ellel ted as in the act of attack, nor even that the passions of fea 
but me,ely that they are retracted and Impeded frora flOWing 
r 'nto action. This i. put In another way: ''Sicut eniaa In eJCercltu pro-
re.slo ad bellea pendet ex '.rlo duels. fta in nobis vis IDOll"e non movet 
ra nl.1 ad ImperiUM •• u. quod In nobis prlnc.,latur. id est rationls. quail-
cUtlque motu. fiat in inferlorlbus vfribus. Uncle ratio frascrbilem et cone .... 
lsclbllem APrJmit, ne In actUrD exterior. proeeUnt.u )7 Here the point Is 
3\e JIt-, 26, '0. 
37 .... .lat., 2S, It. S .. al SO '_Jetan. Speak' ng of the spt r' twa. dell ght tha 
Id orcJlnarUy be consequent upon the wllPs choice of an act of 'ortitude, he 
adm.ts that this delight is not felt in the act of endurance, but goes on to say 
tfundamantUrD aut_ .'us, scilicet ex I!atione et elec:tlone fortlter persister., 
non absorbetur nee: evanesclt: sed quoad hoc: superat ornnes dolor. senslbfl.s .... 
• CeJetan, Commentary on 1.1 •• 11.1" 123.8 c. 
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again that, despite the fact that the passions poll tlve)y continue to pull the 
other way. s tf It the wi II is abl e to repress them to the extent that. they do not 
flow into bodily activity. And this is done by the Intensity with _.eb the act 
~f the wil J Is made. 
Tltl s seems to be precl so, y ... t happens t n the act of endurance. Despl te 
the '..-tus of contrary passion. the wlH, by the lntemitty of Its ec:t. r.fuses 
to eet upon this I,..tul. It Is simply an interior refusal to go to pieees In 
the face of this frontal attad( by the passions. And the refusal to do so 
depends upon a certafn Intense cont.,.latJon of unfvernl consIderations, the 
nature of _Ieb will be discussed later. 
Now. no.r.ver" It aat ght be well to .... riz ..... t has been sal d about the 
interaction of ,.sslon and wIll. First, passion ean influence the will only by 
Influenting Judgment; and It can do this In two closely related ways: first, 
by attrectlng the mind's attention; second, by coloring the Imagination, and 
through the imagination the data on which the practical Intellect Judges.. On 
the other hanel, wl1' can allO influence passion In several .ys: Fi nt. when 
wi J tanel passion both tend in the s_ ell reet Ion. one helps the other. Second, 
If there is no IDOveMent of passIon, or if passion moves contrary to wit J, the 
will c;an control passion by an eet of Gholce. This is done, on the one Mnd, 
by control1 ins the soul's _pect of passion through ehoosi.ng to think about 
those thIngs which will so color the Imagination that they wi 11 call forth the 
des' red passIon or deer .... the uncles I red one; and on the other hand, by contro ... 
ling the bo4Y
'
s compoMftt of passion through choosing to reaDVe the object 
causing pessioo, or vlc.e v.rsa. Thl rei, the wi JJ can Influence passfon through 
redundance frart the Intensity of its own eet. It can, In this way, either call 
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orth a passion corresponding to its own act, or at least prevent a contrary 
asion from ftowi ng into Ktion. 
This theory of the t nterac;tion appl led to the Kts of attac:.k and endurance 
J d seem to \ItiIOrk I n the followi OS way: I n both acts the will wouJ d be f no-
luenced by pusion in the same way, that; Is_ by attention and by coloring the 
~ on .,.deh Judgment fs~. However. only in the act of attack can the 
III Influence passion byelicitins its positive help through a control of the 
bought processes ..... feb Influence tlwlmeglnatlon. by a control of the bodi 1'1 
lCOIiI>Onent of sensation, and by " posl tlva redunclanc:e from the intensity of its 
act. I n the act of endurance thewll' cIoes not seem to have any pos I ti'le 
over the ,.slons in the sense that It can elicit their use. Its only 
Is a negative one in preventing the contra..,. pe$sions frOll flOWing 'nto 
This would 5_ to be ~llshecl through a type of negative re-
undance frQI the Intensity of the wll 1'5 act. 
In an attempt to make these statements clearer, they will now be applied 
o the concrete .... 8' used at the end of Chapter II. 
Ft rst, In the cue of the soldier prior to tbe landing at Normandy, the 
rlano. wou1cf be SCIIDettdll9 like dtl s: As he Nt trying to decide 1Nhether to 
wltb the Invasion army Or' not" he wouhl t_1 strong B>Vement$ of both hope 
The hope would Jead to imaginary pictures of marching trJ~antly 
ross 'renee an4 into Germany, of receIvIng a meetal for bravery, of returning 
a hero, etc. The fear WlUld lead to imaginary pictures of hI.elf lyIng 
tit ated and 4ead on the beach _ Normandy. However. i if be J s to p J ace a 
rue act of fortitude. his will nust. SOIIehow choose to fix the mind's attention 
11 neither of these ttD movements. but on the more universal considerations of 
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reason itself. After doing this, and seeing that reason tells him that he 
should attack, he makes the deGision. Now he is no longer indifferent to the 
feel i ngs he h~ before the choi ce \-:laS 11184e. He chooses ~., to thl nk onl y about 
the hopeful aspects of the situation, of the possibility of victory and of ho~ 
of the strength of his army, of his 0tIIl fi ghU ng fi toess, etc. At the same 
ti_ he finds reasons \lhy fear should be cast out. These considerations tend 
to fi 11 the mind wi th hopeful lma90s. The hope he had before the deci sion 
thereby incrciWlses ;n Intensity, and with it the boldness aiso. He might also 
call up reiJ$Ons \Illy he i. angry at the enemy, and, as this anger grows, it in-
creases the desire to attactk. He could also take eare of the bodily <:Oq)Oneot 
by having a drink or tw. Further, he thinks more about the rational consider .. 
ations which led him to decide to attac;k: love for his CO\Jntry. etc. i and 
these thoughts tend to increase the intensity of his act of the will to attack, 
and this intensity also redounds into the passions to move them eyen more 
strongly. 
Thus, w.en he goes Into battle, he goes as a truly brave Clani for he hti$ 
made a choice unInfluenced by passion, but he also goes as a bold man,flJled 
with a desire for battle which is not Just a rational desire but an animal one 
as well.,8 
lS't is Iqx>rtant to note bere that to act wi th passion i 6 f n no way eon-
trary to vIrtue, provIded that the eet Is in accord with rea,oo. Thus, In 
another context, speaking of the sexual act, St. Thomas states quite positively 
that It Is not against vIrtue to be completely bJlnded by passion In the act 
itself, provided that the act was entered into In accord with r8.50n.-1.1.., II ... 
'1, IS,). 2 ad 2. Thus. applied to the act of attack. the brave man could lose 
hi.el f in boldness and even anger, provided that he had entered the act wi th 
delIberate choice. Cf.l.1., 11-'1, 158. J ad 2. 
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On the other hand, the Christian awaiting his trIal experIences something 
uite different. He experiences only fear of what wilt happen If he chooses to 
.main true to the FaIth. He pictures hImself enveloped in flames. almost feel 
ng the terrible agony as he does so. But despite this fear, his wIll somehow 
oose. to foc:us attention on other considerations. Somehow he resists being 
rrled away by these wild and terrible 'maglnatlons, and In the light of ratIo 
1 eonshleratlons he Judges that he should choose to endure. He makes the 
Now, once the decIsion Is made, there is no passion to call to his 
The realIzation that a painful death awaits him 9r~ yet st~nger. Yet. 
e can to a degree control the workings of his mind and force himself to think 0 
y he is doing this. As the choice is carrIed out. and he actually begins to 
ndergo martyrdom, actual physical pain takes over. Most certainly at this ti 
he battle for control becomes greatest. The imagl nation is now swept away by 
'et, though everythtng within goes contrary, somehow he c1lngs to t 
lit to endure, and by the Intensity of this act he refuses to give way. The 
asslons cry out In pain for flight or an attempt at escape, or for complete de-
pair. But by concentratron on 'the firm decision to endure, the passions are 
Indered from having theIr way." 
These, then, are the sItuatIons of the acts of attack and endurance. It 
as been mo..n In th I s chapter how it I s that the will Is abl e to e_rcl se con-
roJ over the passions in these acts. That Is, It has been shown by what 
J9rhe ultimate exp1anatlon of bow It ~an be that the wlIJ can so control th 
assions seems to be forever bound up in the mystery of the mind's power over t 
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process this control comes about. But It has not been shown whX this control 
does occur. The solution has been hinted at In a general way by stating that 
the control is exercised through attentIon to rational consid~ratlons and througt 
the intensity of the will·s act. It ~uld seem to follow. then. that the utti-
~ate reason for this control, and therefore the ultimate nature of finmitai 
Ian I mae .. wIll depend upon the nature of these ratIonal consrderatlons and the 
~ture of thIs Intense act of the will Itself. This will be the subject of the 
~xt .net fI nal chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
flMIIa! AN!MAE 
The last chapter dealt with the interaction of the passions with reason and 
in men. It ended with the conclusion that the will can control the passlo , 
.ther tncltlng or repressing them, bV choosing to think about certain universal 
.Ideratlons and also by redundance f~ the Intensltv of its own act. 
It will be the purpose of this chepter to consider what these universal 
consIderations and what the Intensity of the wlll's act might be. Since these 
re abtolutely necessarv for an act of fortI tude, they have a dl reet bearing on 
the rea"ty of flrm'SI' tellll- From a consfderatlon of the.e factors it will 
possa bl e to deduce the t rue nature of f I r'l! sa, !Dhll!!t and thus to cone I ude 
the thesIs. 
",st, when St. Thames talk. about the wll,'s choice to think about unt-
ersel considerations, he .... to be speaking of the end for whIch an act of 
rtltude Is to be performed. That is, when a !lin Is faced with a dlfflcultV 
Involving a threat to his life, he naturally turns his mInd to think upon the 
reasons Why he should or should not feee the dl fficulty. Hi 5 passions. work' ng 
througft Imagination, conjure up numerous reasons "V he should not. However, 
• f .... 9' WI hlm.el f • chance. he a1 so the ntet of the good that m. ght be achieved 
meetIng the difficulty_ thIs .uld be the ultimate end Intended In the act. 
It .... is willing to thInk about the end. If he Is thoroughly convInced that 
S9 
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it Is a good end, then It would seem that this conviction, plus the Intensity of 
desire for the end. M)uld COI1'II'Nlnd hfm to face the difficulty involved in attain-
Ing It. 
In thl. connection St. Thomas speaks of several higher vi rtues, hIgher in 
the sense, at least, that they act as ends wIth regard to other virtues. They 
have the power to C\OdIft8nd the other vi FtUftS. For the sake of more concrete 
iI J ustratlon. these COI'II1tancU ng vI rtues wU 1 now be enumerated and up_ al ned, 
.speclally with regaf'd to the'r function In acting as end. for the other virtues 
Gauthier contends that St. Thotus thought in terl1ll of three great COIII'IMlnd-
Ing virtues; 
Les fins lea plus hautes Clut, dans )Iordre naturel. putssent soliciter 
Ie coeur humaln, sont flU nombre cte trois: la grandeur de "bonne, Ie 
bien de 1. COIRInautf{. • 'honneur de lieu, at I. V at dans "ordre na-
ture •• trois grandes ~ertus geDer.les. troIs "gnes de force de la vie 
morale, la ,-snanrmlte, Ja Justice socl.le, I. rellgJo~. Alns' la 
magnanJml t. embrasse toutes les vert us at les ordonne a la grandeur de 
l l hona1e. la Justl~ 1OC •• le embras.e toute. le. vertus et 'es ordonne 
:r:!:n.:-.!: !!~n! a~r~!~:!:u~e:e:1e:~e t~:!:!~u::! S c!:U!::. ~::ionSI 
11 n'v a PM confl ft, _Is hanDnle. car Ja perapnne humalne ne trouve I 
sa grandeur que dfms Ie service de la COIDInaUte et dans Ie culte de Dieu. 
First. tDl9mmimlty II the ¥Irt .... _Ida provides the motive of human nobil. 
I ty. 2 Thus. a 118ft .Ignt be awed to .. act of vi rtue by considering the 
J I Gauthier. M!gnanlm.te, pp. 31.311. 
~Mnl.lty here Is taken In a sUghtly different sense from that of 
Chapter II .re It wa. shown to be necesNry for the Kt of attack. There 
magnanr.'ty ... necessary to generate hope of actual success in overcoming the 
difficulty. Here magnanlmltv is used as • vrrtue which calls forth an act of 
forti tude by off.rlng hope of a different kind. Here I t would be hope I n a 
wider sense. hope of conducting oneself in a manner worthv of • human being 
regardles. of whether or not there Is any real hope of overcoming the actual 
phystcal difficulty. In this sense magnanimIty couJd apply to the act of 
endurance as weI. as the act of attack. It simply provIdes the motIve of act-
ing nobly, which can be used In the act of any vIrtue. 
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I1Obl1 Ity of the ae~~ and in this sense ll1iI9n.animity "" eaJl fort.h the act of any 
lIirtue. II(H)agnantmltas ••• operatur magna In onraibus virtutibus .... quasi 
noventis per 'tllperium ... 3 Therefore, a man might be IROVed to perform an aet of 
Fortitude by considering simply the rational good of acting in it manner worthy 
~f human digAi ty. 
Second, Justice, taken In iI wider sense here than the usual sense of render .. 
n9 another .. t is his due, is the virtue which orders aU of human .actlvtty 
oward the connon g<'.)OG. "(8)onum eulu,Jlbet virtuti., aive ordinantis a1 iquem 
!KJmlnem ad asl,sum sive ordlnantis ipsum ad 81 iquas al las personas singulares, 
~st referibile ad bonum CCMD&ne, ad quod G.-dlnat Justitia. Et secund_ hoe 
~tus omnium vlrtutem poa.unt ad Justitia. pertinere. seeundum quod ordinat 
itOmlnem ad boOla c:c:8lUne ... 4 Thus, the motive of doing something for the eommon 
IJood ean nove a person to perform any one of the other v I rtuos. St. Thomas 
Joes not mean to say simply that the other vi rtues perta' n to Justice, but that 
ustlee actually GlOves them into aetivity: uJustltia ••• dieltur esse vlrtus 
~ralls inquantLII .c:llicet ordlnat actus aliarua virtutem ad suum finea, quod 
st AIOvere per impart URI omnes alias vi rtutes.uS 
Third. the virtue of re"gion ean also be a motive power for the other 
frtues. '·(O)'cenc". quod re1igio habet duplfces actus. Quosd_ quldem prop-
'J.n III !.Ir!1-, 9. 1.2. A like statement of magnanimitv's power to conmand 
he othir virtues Is not found in the Summa" but it Is Gauthierts contention that 
t. Thomas stili meant this when be WJ"ote the SUt1lN •• -oauthier. p. 368" note S. 
4 1.1-, II-II, 58,s e. 
5 :.uwt •• 1 e. 
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rios et immediatos, quos elicit, per quos homo ordlnatur ad solum Deum; sieut 
saerifleere, adorar. et alta hulusmodi. Alios autem actus habet quos producit 
medfantibus v'rtut'bus quibus imperat. ordinans eos in dlvlnam reverenti .. : qui. 
scilicet vlrtus ad quam pert I net finis. ia.,erat virtutibus acI quas pertinet ea 
quae sunt ad flns ... 6 This passage brings out very clearly bow It is that 
religton .... well as the other vIrtues spoken of bere, moves another virtue tnto 
operatIon. It does so because it is thought of as an end to be attained. 
Thus. tM untver5a1 consIderations spoken of previously by which a Mrl can eon-
t rol his i mag I uti on ami his pass tons. are nothi OS mre than though ts of the 
end. proposed by these commanding virtues together with the destre to attain 
these ends. 
Finally, It might be mentioned bere also that in the supernatural order 
charity .ould be the counterpart of the natural virtue of religion. Indeed. In 
Christian Ji fe It is the great commanding vi rtue \!Ihlch ought to provide the 
motivation fo·r all the other vi rtues. "Et Mne etl_ apparet, qUC'.JRK)do carltas 
si t motor omnium vi rtutum: InqUAntum sell ieet I.erat actus omnIum aliarum 
vlrtutum. Omnls enira virtul vel potentia SUPerior dJcltur fDOYere per imperium 
'nf.rlorem. ex eo quod actUI Inf.rlor ordinatur ad flnem luperioris. lf7 
The$8 above are the genera' vf rtues ., ch have the power to act as ends for 
all the others. However, thl. does not exclude the possibility that some 
6 l..2.iJl., 81. 1 ad 1. 
7.b iIL-, 3 c. Cf. George P. lUubertanz. S.J. l'The Unity of Human 
l\etJvity," Ibt. ~ §s;bogJ!!n. XXVII (January 1950), 75-103. This explains 
'n detail how c.1l&rT'tY 'nforms the other vi rtues. 
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particular virtue might command the act of another. In this connection St. 
Thomas speaks of an example in ~ich the virtue of temperance COIlIQar.ds an act of 
fortitude. The example used is that of a woman martyr who chooses to Jose her 
Jlfe rather than to have her chastity vioJated.8 It was her love for purity 
tIIIh i ch demanded that she die i nits defense. Thus I t was the virtue of temper-
ance .. Ich beeame the end for which the act of forti tude was pi aced. CaJetan 
exp1ains such a situation: 1t(l)deo oportet ad hoc ut ten.,erantia sit ita per-
fecta ut sit ,ufficlens salvare saips_. quod sit eti. perfecta imperative. hoc 
est ut habet actum ,..,.rt i ad alios actus exclusivos extraneorum contrariorum. 
puta ad imperandum actuf fortitudlnis ne propter tlmorem mortis pe.rdatur temper. 
antla.,,9 
It mIght seem from what has been saId about these coananding virtues that 
the ficeiSti llOi!19 of fortitude consists in nothing more than the firm con-
vi ctton of one or lOre of these other vi rtues coupled wi th the wi) Jl $ ardent 
desire to practice it. But such an Interpretation cannot be maintained. fIrst 
this would rule out the necessity of having a separate virtue of fortitude. To 
face death for the love of God, 'for e~ie, would be simply an act of charity. 
Now, to be sure, it is an act of charity; but St. Thomas maintains that It Is 
allo much more. It is an act of fortitude. The reason is that a single act 
ean at the same time be an act of more than one vIrtue. "Nihil autem prohlbet 
unum actua a diversEs habftibus informar., at secundum hoc ad diversas species 
8 1.1., II-II. 124. 4 ad 2. 
9CaJetan, Commentary on the Summa, II-II. 124, 2, p. )0. 
reduct ordtne quocIaD.u JO 
This Is not .rely ,. questIon of rational cllatlnetfona. St. Thoen clear., 
.-ana that to face cleath for the Jove of God, or for any other good reason, ,. 
ran "It not only haYe the vi rlue of chtu'lty" or so. other C<'IIIlIIItndlng vi rtue, 
but allO a separate r.atlty which constItute. the vIrtue of fortItude. Ther. 
"It be IOIBtbfng in the IOU) beyond the COIWlctlon that God exists and the con-
.equent love aM •• Ire for him. 
tt i. In this sense that St. Tboall .... the distinction betleen the vIr-
tue which coanands the act anca that ""'Cob eUcits It. In the above quotations 
the notion of the vi rtue which coamancts has been brought out clearly. A. a 
concrete eJCMpl. here, St. T .... s says of the act of .rtyrdom tht charity Is 
the up,l .. et principal. IIOtfVum, per ... vlrtutls '..-,antls.ulJ aut he 
a)1O says that fortitude fl the umtivUlt ,roprl...., per modUlI virtutls e-
Ilelenth.ull Cajetan explaIns thIs PUMg81 HEt llcet Mrtyrh .. lit setaper 
harum trlum v.rtutta actul ratione dlct_usa elul condltfonum. oaritatls tamen 
at fide. non nhd '..-,aU ... fortitudlnis aut_ at lei tfyO •••• Actus namque 
a pluribus procedens v'rtutlbul est elf.ltlve utt ..... cui dIrect. r.spondet 
actus filet sieut actus emenens • plurIbus potent", spectat eUef dve ati 
tOs.t., II_II. 4. , ad I. C~etan further ~Jaln. this notion: Stat 
quod unus numero secundum .ubstantl~ actus lit in plurIbus vtrtutum generfbus 
••• Nul h. 'ftCOAVenlenr; <t.t eumkIiIQ ct_ ratione un.us cl reudlSt_dae .peetar. 
ed unUIII genua vfrtuth. at ratione a1 terius spec tare ad a"ud genus.u-Cajetan, 
Coaaentary OIl 1.1 •• II-II, 'JIl. p .. 30. 
n 1.1.. 11.11, 124. 2 .. 2. 
11~. 
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Inftmam illarum potentiarum.ul) 
FrOID these passages I t is el ear that forti tude I s a separate rull ty in f t-
sel f. It IllUlt be conel uded, then, that \l4tJl. tne COIIIUndl ng vI rtue does some-
how flow into the act, It fs not the only cause of the act. CaJetan puts this 
_II I n a c:onaentary on the cas. of the woman martyr \IIIho performs an act of 
forti tude to preserve her chasti ty: It (D) I cen<kn quod temp. rant i tile actus, in 
ASU poslto, Imperative coedJuvat ad produetlonem fortltudlnls.,,14 tlere the 
iq>Ortant word '5 s;oeUms. The CORIMncllng virtue helps, but It does not do 
everythIng. 
This can perhaps be made elearer by a IIOre Of' less formalIzed narrative of 
__ at occurs In the soul during the fOnHtlon of an eet of forti tude. The 
1UI,,'e of an act of martyr ... tr.ated pttUosophicalJy, will be used. The 
process would be something JlIee this: FIrst, there Is a very deep conviction 
.. "thin the soul of God's ex'st_ce and of the other truths of the FaIth. Second, 
there I s an intense des I re to serve God I n aU th. ngl and to reme' n true to the 
1I'.lth. ThIs Is charity. low, all goes well in the practice of faIth and 
=bartty until finally persecution comes along and the picture changes consider. 
~bly. Now the practice of f.lth and charity Involves a threat to life itself • 
• n fact, to preserve f.'th and charity meanl certain death. Here fear re.rl Its 
~'Y head. This makes the person think again and ' .... examine the situation: 
'Tlmr conell iativol f.:it. uIS If the fear Is strong enough and gains complete 
I 'Cajetaft.Coamentary on 1.1 •• II-II, 124, 2, ,. )0. 
14caJetan. Commentary on 1.1., II-II, 123, S. p. 14. 
15 M. 1.1., 1.11, ....... 2 c. 
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:ontro! over the imagination and the practical Judgment, the will may choose not 
to have the intellect think about the ends proposed by faith and charity; and 
hey are abandoned In favor of the end proposed by passion. 
However. if the will chooses to have the Intellect thl nk about the ends 
I>roposed by fai th and charity, to raeonst der fal th and chari ty in the Ii ght of 
,"his new circumstance of CIt difficulty ~lich stands in the way. then a step to-
.rds the fonaation of an act of fortitude has been taken. This step probably 
ifill be taken if fal th an;of chari ty have al ready been grasped ina thorough eon-
~i ctl on of thel r vat ue. 
Now then. if on consideration the person finds that he really is deeply con-
~Inced of the truths of his FaIth and that he really does want to love God, then 
I1e Is led through it practical syllogi5tll of some sort which would seem to end with 
~he prac:ticat conclusion that difficulties are to be met for the sake of a good 
~nd.16 Pe~s more partIcularly, the conclusion would be that difficulties 
~re to be met for the sake of faith and charity. Even more particularly, the 
l=Oocluslon would be that this difficulty should be met here and now for the sake 
~f faith and charity. The will ,accepts this Judgment, and thereby elicits an 
act of fortitude, making It possible for the Judgment to flow into a<:tivity. 
There Seeat to be t.o very Important poInts involved here. First. the end 
ntended. the ul timete reason for the act. the mot I ve, t $ of the utmost i q:tOrt-
16A discussIon of prudence has been avoided In this thesis. However, it Is 
mportant to realize that prudence Is essentl., to the formatfon of all these 
,irtues. fl(E)x ea omnes alla$ vlrtutes morales reetftudlnem election's parti-
.. 'pant, et sle eius actus hmdscetur aetlbus omnium allarum vlrtutum.'l_l.!:!. III 
i.!D.1., 9. I, 1. 2. Again, u(P}rudentia adluvat OIDneS vlrtutes. et in omnibus 
~eretur ••• sleut sol aliqualiter fnfluft In omnIa corpora.H-l.I., II-II, 
~7, 6 ad 3. 
anc.e t n formi n9 an ae t of fort I tude. The J udgmen t that d Iff i cu 1 ty shou I cJ be 
met for it good end could never have been reached, in the case given, were it not 
for the previous interiorly grasped conviction that God does exist and should be 
served. In other words, this conclusion which leads directly to the act of 
fortitude Is subsumed under a I'IW,)re universal Judgment. H($)ieut ratio 'pecW!!> 
latlv. procedit ad conciusionem ex principiis per se nods. fta ratio pruclentiae 
procedi t a4 electionem et consn i um de hi IS quae sunt ad finem ex fine. et Ideo 
dlcuntur fInes aliarum virtutum esse principia prudent'ae.,,)7 This brings out 
very clearly the iq>ortance of motivation in St. Thomas's theory of alma) virtue 
The power to place an act of fortitude depends upon the possibility of rational 
conviction. 
The second iq>ertant point is this, that, although the act of fortitude 
does ultimately depend upon some higber motivation, still, It does have Its own 
distinctive real fty. In the illustration given the act of fordtude could not 
have been placed were it not for the formation of a specific: practlcal judgment 
that dlffic:ulty tlI.tst be faced for the sake of a good end. This judgment had to 
be accepted by the wi 11 as good' before the act of fort' tude could become it real-
ity. That Is, the speelflc aspect of meeting difficulty. tbe dlffic:ulty of 
meet! n9 the danger of death f tsel f. had to c:c.ne t nto focus and be grasped an<I 
accepted as good. 
, In thf s sense fort itude Is II rasH ty in i tse It, has a mot i va pecuJf sr to 
itself, has an end of its own, though mE ttedly only it proximate end. And the 
preei se end of forti tude is to expose the self to the danger of death. It (A)etu 
17J.!l1l1 ~., 33, 2, S ad 6. 
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numani praecipue dijudicantur ex fine •••• Ad fortem autem pertinet ut 50 
exponat pericuJis mortis propter bonum.IlIS That is, the very end of fortitude 
itself is to expose oneself to the danger of death for a good reason. That is 
why the point has been made here that somehow the practical reason, through the 
virtue of prudence, must arrive at a conclusion which states that difficulty mus 
be feeed for the sake of II good end. It Is this principle li1IIhic:h is responsible 
for the act of fortitude itself, which elicits the act. It Is this principle 
which gives fortitude Its own end and makes It a virtue In Its own right. 
Thus, while the strength to perform an act of fortitude, the flrmltil 
an i RIM. may depend upon hi sher mot I vat ion, f I !J!i SII ani ptE I tse I f \«lU i d seem to 
consIst rather In a practical concl uslon grasped and accepted by the will that 
to mcJet the danger of death for a good end Is • good In itself. It would seem 
that fortitude .s suc:b is fo.-.d only when th's principle becoInes operatlve. 19 
Tb •• , of course, leads tbe discussion naturally into the questIon of habit. 
Thus fa, the thesis has concentrated on the fonaation of a single act of fort.-
tude, the reason being that bablts of MOral virtues are fonDed only through acts 
and therefore the act ... st first be understood In order to understand the habit. 
Now that It has becoale clear __ at f!nelt" lBiltt is in a single act, it ea 
more easily be seen what It would be in a habit. It N)Uld seem that as lI'IOI'e 
acts of fortitude are placed tess attention need be pJaced on the ultimate moti-
vation. that h. on the virtue conrnandlng the act. Fortitude as Its own MOtive 
t~.I .• 11-", 125. 2 ad 2. 
19Cf• l!!! .• 123. 7. for. statement of how fortitude can have Its own end 
and stili be pI aced as an eet ordered to a further end. It Is a question of 
the dIfference between proxImate and ultimate ends. 
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comes more to the fore. and a simple referenee to the principle that It is good 
to meet the danger of death for a good and becames more and more sufficient to 
elicit the act of fortitude. 
In this sense CaJetan maintaIns that when the habit has been fonned It is 
possible to say that a man ccm act wi th fortI tucle as the primary end while 
another virtue .rely provides the matter for tbe eet. Speaking. again, of an 
act of forti tude placed to preserve the vi ftue of tecaperanee, he says: itS, 
utraque vlrtus inest secunel_ exereitlum proprJum habitus temperantf. non i&apera • 
ut dictum est, actum fortitudinh. sed solum _ter._ dat fortltudlnl. ex hoc 
ipso qu04 raddl t tale perieuhn mort.s optimum, ae per hoc. materlam cl rea quam 
fortis fortlter se habet sustlnendo. Ita •••• non est actus temperantiee 
nee elicitly. nee Imperative, proprl e 'oquendo, nisi forte ex parte materi_ 
circa quaM est fortitudo, quas' imperare dleatur quIa exeltat fortltudfnem 
eonstltuen40 ... ter'am elrca quam versar. debet.1l20 
Thus, as the habit is fonned, the motivation of fortitude Its.lf seems to 
become .re and more dissociated from the motivatIon of some higher CODIDanding 
virtue. at least In the sense that this connandlng virtue no longer prImarily 
2°CaJetan. Commentary on 1-1 .• II-I •• 123. 5. p. IS. 
21 
moves the act. 
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In fact. the notion of habit would seem to go even beyond the mre notion 
of fortitude becoming more and more an end in itself. and less and less depend. 
ant for its force on other vi rtues. For it woul d seem that a person who really 
had the habit In its fullest sense 'l«)utd have achieved such e control over his 
passIons that they would now respond spontaneously fn the correct way. That is 
they would have achieved such partfclpation In the motivation spoken of that 
they would now respond spontaneously to the apprehensIon of a dIfficulty to be 
mat for a good end. This would mean that when the sItuation Is seen as one 
where reason dfctates that It is good to meet the danger of death, the passions 
spontaneous'y fall into fine. If reason calls for attack, boldness spontane-
ously comes tnto play, and In the proper proportion. In fact, even before the 
decision to attack, the passions of hope and fear were properly balanced, thus 
making the decision easfer. If the situation calls for endurance, the passions 
21'erhaps It Is In this sense that St. Thomas speaks of the convertIbility 
of the vIrtue of fortitude: "Qui enlm potest f.rmlter stare In his quae sunt 
difflcl" fma ad susttneMum, consequens est quod sit .donaus ad reslstendum 
allIs quae sunt minus dlfflclJla."-S.T •• II-II. t.t', 2 ad 2. In other t«>rds. 
If a person has enough fired'" IO'!!! to face the danger of death. he can turn 
dds s .. fl n'IIneSl against My Jesser danger. ~Y'9r. this would seem to 
Imply a dissocIation of the ";P"'I IQ':ar from any particular motivation 
coming eitber from soma partlcu ar COfIIINtn Ing virtue or from some particular 
type of difficulty. Thus the determination to face a difficulty 'l«)uld have to 
be dIssociated from the motivation furnished by charity, Justice, temperance, 
etc., and would. have to concentrate sl.,y on the goodness of facing a difficult., 
for.i!ll good end. Likewise. the determInation would have to be dissocIated 
from the difficulty of meeting the danger of death, and t.DuJd have to c:oncentrat~ 
simply on the goodness of meeting .I!!l riot of difficulty for any good end. 
But If this motivation remahui partTcu ar zed the transfer wlJ I not occur. 
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.pontaneously refuse to precipitate flight or Interior despai r. ThIs ...culd be 
~ description of the truly brave man, the man who has so fully integrated hi~ 
~elf that his entire organism responds properly In a sftuatlon calling for 
pravery. 
HoNever, in the case of fortitude St. Thomas seems to be truly dubious that 
~he habit would ever develop to this degree. This ~Id seem to be particularly 
JO I n the act of endurance "ere reason .1one performs the act. The fact Is 
~hat. since the specific act of fortitude Is that of facing the danger of death, 
n the act of endurance In Its fuHeat sense as described in tbls thesis It would 
:>e impossIble to develop the habit because the opportunity to practice could 
:ollie but once. lven In the act of attack St. Thomas would seem to hesitate in 
,Iaclng too 8LtCb faith in the habit. 
Thus. when speaking of whether or not the truly brave man should be able to 
~espond to the danger of deeth at a IIQIIIIIN'tt's notice, he states that, to be sure, 
a responcl In such a situation would be sure proof thet a man has the habit of 
Fortitude.1I However. he goes on to say that this is not essential to the brave 
aan. s I nee prudence dictates that. even I f he seeas to have the bab I t he should 
~einforce I t by premeditation whenever possible. "'1Igft enlm forth praemecU. 
arl perfeu). quae possunt Immlnere. ut els resistere posslt, aut facllius ferre. 
23 In other tIlOrds. sl nee the ul timete ac::t of forti tude is such a serious 
~ffelr. prudeoc::e dictates that a man ought not to trust that he has the habit to 
%2'.1_, II-II, 123. 9 c. 
23 S.T., II-It, J23. 9 c. 
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a sufficient degree. Therefore, from this statement it would seem that the 
fir.U. ani_ N:)uld ordinarily come. not s'q:>ly through the spontaneous move-
ments of the passions habitually participating in reasOft, but from fi~ ratIonal 
conviction and detenainatlon gained as a result of meditation. 
From all this perhaps a final eonclusion as to the nature of fi [Ii tal 
Inl. c:Itn now be drawn. This eonc} uslon will be stated in the forna of a 
series of propositions: (I) It depends for its original fOl'1QOt'on upon the 
higher motlvat.on of other virtues, and ultimately upon the convictfons of the 
speculative intellect. (2) In Itself It Is an ultimate practical judgment of 
the practical Intellect, finaly grasped by the will, to the effect that It Is 
good to meet the danger of death for a good end. (3) As a practical convict. 
flnnly grasped by the will It tends to control the lmeglnation, and thus Influ-
ences the movements of the passions. (4) Through being repeatedly carrted In-
to operation it tends to so educate the passions that they spontaneously parti-
cipate In this prInciple. 
Fi nally, from these propositions it can be seen that the all important 
factor in the act of fortitude is that practical judgment of the practical 
intellect. fi r.ly grasped and adhered to by tho wtl J: I t Is good to meet the 
danger of death for a good end. This is flmal$ll tni •• 
It is true that this Judgment has been formed under the influence of hlghe 
motl vati on and that it has been accepted as good under the I nfl uence of h f gher 
motIvation. But It Is a reality In Itself, a reality eliciting the specific 
act of fortitude. 
It il also true that In some eases the passions may aid in an act of forti 
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tude. but it i $ :eht!XI the adhel'ence to thi s practi cal judgment whi ch makes the 
act possible. 
Thus, both the soldier who went to the attack at t~orl\landy and the martyr 
who died for the Faith did so because each had grasped and adhered to the same 
Judgment of the practical intellect: It is good to meet the danger of death fo 
a good end. 
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